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Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care

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  • Pedro Pita Barros
  • Xavier Martínez-Giralt

Abstract

A feature present in countries with a National Health Service is the coexistence of a public and a private sector. Often, the public payer contracts with private providers while holding idle capacity. This is often seen as inefficiency from the management of public facilities. We present here a different rationale for the existence of such idle capacity: the public sector may opt to have idle capacity as a way to gain bargaining power vis-à-vis the private provider, under the assumption of a more efficient private than the public sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Pedro Pita Barros & Xavier Martínez-Giralt, 2005. "Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care," Working Papers 170, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:170
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. A. Michael Spence, 1979. "Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
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    3. Pedro Barros & Xavier Martinez-Giralt, 2005. "Negotiation Advantages of Professional Associations in Health Care," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 191-204, June.
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    7. Xavier Martinez-Giralt & Pedro Pita Barros, 2000. "Selecting Negotiation Processes with Health Care," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 467.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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    Cited by:

    1. Luigi Siciliani & Anderson Stanciole, 2013. "Bargaining and the provision of health services," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 14(3), pages 391-406, June.
    2. Hiroshi Aiura & Yasuo Sanjo, 2010. "Privatization of local public hospitals: effect on budget, medical service quality, and social welfare," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 275-299, September.
    3. ., 2012. "Models of Negotiation and Bargaining in Health Care," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 21, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    negotiation; health care;

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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