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Political Preferences and the Spatial Distribution of Infrastructure: Evidence from California's High-Speed Rail

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Listed:
  • Nicole Gorton
  • Cecile Gaubert
  • Pablo D. Fajgelbaum
  • Eduardo Morales
  • Edouard Schaal

Abstract

How do political preferences shape transportation policy? We study this question in the context of California's High-Speed Rail (CHSR). Combining geographic data on votes in a referendum on the CHSR with a model of its expected economic benefits, we estimate the weight of economic and non-economic considerations in voters'preferences. Then, comparing the proposed distribution of CHSR stations with alternative placements, we use a revealed-preference approach to estimate policymakers' preferences for redistribution and popular approval. While voters did respond to expected real-income benefits, non-economic factors were a more important driver of the spatial distribution of voters' preferences for the CHSR. While the voter-approved CHSR would have led to modest income gains, proposals with net income losses also would have been approved due to political preferences. For the planner, we identify strong preferences for popular approval. A politically-blind planner would have placed the stations closer to dense metro areas in California.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicole Gorton & Cecile Gaubert & Pablo D. Fajgelbaum & Eduardo Morales & Edouard Schaal, 2023. "Political Preferences and the Spatial Distribution of Infrastructure: Evidence from California's High-Speed Rail," Working Papers 1397, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1397
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Deacon, Robert T & Shapiro, Perry, 1975. "Private Preference for Collective Goods Revealed Through Voting on Referenda," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 943-955, December.
    2. De Borger, Bruno & Proost, Stef, 2012. "A political economy model of road pricing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 79-92.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political economy; infrastructure; transportation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • P11 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
    • R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
    • R4 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics

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