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Benevolent Mediation in the Shadow of Conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Andrea Canidio
  • Joan-Maria Esteban

Abstract

We propose a novel arbitration procedure. This procedure allows a completely uninformed arbitrator to efficiently settle a dispute between two fully informed players. The novelty is that we allow the players to make wasteful, pre-negotiation investments aimed at manipulating the outcome of the arbitration. Our arbitration procedure is such that these investments are minimized. The core of the arbitration procedure is a “concession game” in which the third party shares the available peace dividend as a function of the concessions made by each player. The concession game can be used to eliminate offensive investments, that is, investments that make the conflict occurring in case no agreement is reached more destructive.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Canidio & Joan-Maria Esteban, 2018. "Benevolent Mediation in the Shadow of Conflict," Working Papers 1027, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1027
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    File URL: https://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/1027.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Marcos-Prieto, Pablo, 2024. "Conflict initiation function shapes the evolution of persistent outcomes in group conflict," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; arbitration; concessions; conflict;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

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