IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdi/wptemi/td_905_13.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Family firms and the Great Recession: out of sight, out of mind?

Author

Listed:
  • Leandro D�Aurizio

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Livio Romano

    (European University Institute)

Abstract

This paper studies how family firms reacted to the 2008 economic crisis by adjusting employment. In particular, we look at how the geographical distribution of the workforce may have led to divergencies between family and non-family firms. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we provide empirical evidence that paths of adjustment did diverge, with family firms systematically preferring to safeguard workplaces close to headquarters. We offer a new theoretical framework, the social recognition motive, that is consistent with this finding; it is based on contributions in the literature on corporate governance that stress the importance of the non-pecuniary benefits of the owner's control of the family firm. The social recognition motive originates from the psychological relation linking the family-firm owner with his or her community. The theory also offers a clear set of predictions that are all confirmed by the data. Alternative explanations, although theoretically plausible, seem to be ruled out in our setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Leandro D�Aurizio & Livio Romano, 2013. "Family firms and the Great Recession: out of sight, out of mind?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 905, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_905_13
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temi-discussione/2013/2013-0905/en_tema_905.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Augustin Landier & Vinay B. Nair & Julie Wulf, 2009. "Trade-offs in Staying Close: Corporate Decision Making and Geographic Dispersion," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(3), pages 1119-1148.
    2. Andrew Clark & Andreas Knabe & Steffen Rätzel, 2009. "Unemployment as a Social Norm in Germany," Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 129(2), pages 251-260.
    3. Mark Granovetter, 2005. "The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 33-50, Winter.
    4. Andrea Bassanini & Thomas Breda & Eve Caroli & Antoine Rebérioux, 2010. "Working in family firms: less paid but more secure? Evidence from French matched employer-employee data," Working Papers halshs-00564972, HAL.
    5. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
    6. David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2007. "Performance and Behavior of Family Firms: Evidence from the French Stock Market," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 709-751, June.
    7. Oriana Bandiera & Luigi Guiso & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2015. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(3), pages 623-681.
    8. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    9. Andrew Ellul & Marco Pagano & Fausto Panunzi, 2010. "Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2414-2450, December.
    10. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition," IEW - Working Papers 084, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    11. Favero, Carlo A. & Panunzi, Fausto & Giglio, Stefano & Honorati, Maddalena, 2006. "The Performance of Italian Family Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5786, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Federico Cingano & Paolo Pinotti, 2013. "Politicians At Work: The Private Returns And Social Costs Of Political Connections," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 433-465, April.
    13. Guiso, Luigi & Rustichini, Aldo, 2018. "Understanding the size and profitability of firms: The role of a biological factor," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 65-85.
    14. repec:bla:jfinan:v:58:y:2003:i:3:p:1301-1327 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2004. "The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 526-556, June.
    16. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1328, June.
    17. Claudio Michelacci & Olmo Silva, 2007. "Why So Many Local Entrepreneurs?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-633, November.
    18. Dufwenberg, Martin & Lundholm, Michael, 2001. "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 506-525, July.
    19. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2002. "Social Capital and Community Governance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 419-436, November.
    20. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
    21. Bianco, Madga & Golinelli, Roberto & Parigi, Giuseppe, 2009. "Family firms and investments," MPRA Paper 19247, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Laurent Bach & Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, 2009. "The Power of Dynastic Commitment," Working Papers 0924, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    23. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation," Macroeconomics 0409026, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    24. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2002. "Why Social Preferences Matter -- The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 1-33, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Bassanini & Giorgio Brunello & Eve Caroli, 2017. "Not in My Community: Social Pressure and the Geography of Dismissals," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 429-483.
    2. Francesco Bripi, 2016. "The Role of Regulation on Entry: Evidence from the Italian Provinces," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 30(2), pages 383-411.
    3. Andrea Bassanini & Thomas Breda & Eve Caroli & Antoine Rebérioux, 2010. "Working in family firms: less paid but more secure? Evidence from French matched employer-employee data," Working Papers halshs-00564972, HAL.
    4. D'Aurizio, Leandro & Oliviero, Tommaso & Romano, Livio, 2015. "Family firms, soft information and bank lending in a financial crisis," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 279-292.
    5. Andrew Ellul & Marco Pagano & Fabiano Schivardi, 2018. "Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(4), pages 1298-1340.
    6. Backman, Mikaela & Palmberg, Johanna, 2015. "Contextualizing small family firms: How does the urban–rural context affect firm employment growth?," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 247-258.
    7. Stefano Amato & Rodrigo Basco & Nicola Lattanzi, 2022. "Contextualizing employment outcomes in family business research: current findings and future research avenues," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 531-604, June.
    8. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13579 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Andrea Bassanini & Thomas Breda & Eve Caroli & Antoine Rebérioux, 2013. "Working in Family Firms: Paid Less but More Secure? Evidence from French Matched Employer-Employee Data," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 66(2), pages 433-466, April.
    10. Francesca Modena & Concetta Rondinelli & Fabio Sabatini, 2014. "Economic Insecurity and Fertility Intentions: The Case of Italy," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 60(S1), pages 233-255, May.
    11. Kölling, Arnd, 2017. "Employment in family firms: Less but safe? Analyzing labor demand of German family firms with a treatment model for panel data," Working Papers 92, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute of Management Berlin (IMB).
    12. repec:zbw:imbwps:90 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Fabrizio Pompei & Mirella Damiani & Andrea Ricci, 2019. "Family firms, performance-related pay, and the great crisis: evidence from the Italian case," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 28(5), pages 1193-1225.
    14. Bjuggren, Carl Magnus, 2015. "Sensitivity to shocks and implicit employment protection in family firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 18-31.
    15. Matteo Luciani & Libero Monteforte, 2012. "Uncertainty and Heterogeneity in factor models forecasting," Working Papers 5, Department of the Treasury, Ministry of the Economy and of Finance.
    16. Massimiliano Affinito, 2013. "Central bank refinancing, interbank markets, and the hypothesis of liquidity hoarding: evidence from a euro-area banking system," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 928, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    17. Kölling, Arnd, 2016. "Family Firms and Labor Demand: Size Matters – But Only the Small Ones are Different," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145471, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    18. Colussi, Tommaso & Romano, Livio, 2016. "Is There a Preferential Treatment for Locals in the Labor Market? Evidence from Takeovers," IZA Discussion Papers 10418, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Basco, Rodrigo, 2015. "Family business and regional development—A theoretical model of regional familiness," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 259-271.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrea Bassanini & Thomas Breda & Eve Caroli & Antoine Rebérioux, 2013. "Working in Family Firms: Paid Less but More Secure? Evidence from French Matched Employer-Employee Data," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 66(2), pages 433-466, April.
    2. Andrea Bassanini & Thomas Breda & Eve Caroli & Antoine Rebérioux, 2010. "Working in family firms: less paid but more secure? Evidence from French matched employer-employee data," Working Papers halshs-00564972, HAL.
    3. Murro, Pierluigi & Peruzzi, Valentina, 2019. "Family firms and access to credit. Is family ownership beneficial?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 173-187.
    4. Andrew Ellul & Marco Pagano & Fabiano Schivardi, 2018. "Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(4), pages 1298-1340.
    5. Laurent Bach & Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, 2009. "The Power of Dynastic Commitment," Working Papers 0924, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    6. Isakov, Dušan & Weisskopf, Jean-Philippe, 2015. "Pay-out policies in founding family firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 330-344.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5922 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Jun-Koo Kang & Jungmin Kim, 2020. "Do Family Firms Invest More than Nonfamily Firms in Employee-Friendly Policies?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1300-1324, March.
    9. Bjuggren, Carl Magnus, 2015. "Sensitivity to shocks and implicit employment protection in family firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 18-31.
    10. Bouzgarrou, Houssam & Navatte, Patrick, 2013. "Ownership structure and acquirers performance: Family vs. non-family firms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 123-134.
    11. Achleitner, Ann-Kristin & Braun, Reiner & Kaserer, Christoph & Jarchow, Svenja & Keppler, Henry & Szewczyk, Justin, 2019. "Börsennotierte Familienunternehmen in Deutschland: Bedeutung, Merkmale, Performance," Studien, Stiftung Familienunternehmen / Foundation for Family Businesses, number 250033, May.
    12. Maria Rosaria Carillo & Vincenzo Lombardo & Alberto Zazzaro, 2013. "Family Firm Connections and Entrepreneurial Human Capital in the Process of Development," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 89, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    13. Kölling, Arnd, 2016. "Family Firms and Labor Demand: Size Matters – But Only the Small Ones are Different," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145471, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. repec:zbw:imbwps:90 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Anderson, Ronald W. & Hamadi, Malika, 2009. "Large powerful shareholders and cash holding," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24422, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Achleitner, Ann-Kristin & Kaserer, Christoph & Kauf, Tobias & Volk, Sarah, 2010. "DAXplus family: Ein Aktienindex zur Darstellung der Performance von Familienunternehmen [DAXplus Family – Primer on a family firm stock index in Germany]," CEFS Working Paper Series 2010-05, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).
    17. Andersson, Fredrik W. & Johansson, Dan & Karlsson, Johan & Lodefalk, Magnus & Poldahl, Andreas, 2017. "The Characteristics and Performance of Family Firms: Exploiting information on ownership, governance and kinship using total population data," Working Papers 2017:1, Örebro University, School of Business.
    18. Valentina Peruzzi, 2017. "Does family ownership structure affect investment-cash flow sensitivity? Evidence from Italian SMEs," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(43), pages 4378-4393, September.
    19. Amore, Mario Daniele & Miller, Danny & Le Breton-Miller, Isabelle & Corbetta, Guido, 2017. "For love and money: Marital leadership in family firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 461-476.
    20. Oriana Bandiera & Luigi Guiso & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2015. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(3), pages 623-681.
    21. Christopher Hansen & Joern Block & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2020. "Family Firm Performance Over The Business Cycle: A Meta‐Analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 476-511, July.
    22. Vikas Mehrotra & Randall Morck & Jungwook Shim & Yupana Wiwattanakantang, 2010. "Must Love Kill the Family Firm?," NBER Working Papers 16340, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    family firms; Great Recession; employment; social pressure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_905_13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bdigvit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.