IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bcb/wpaper/548.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Credit Allocation When Private Banks Distribute Government Loans

Author

Listed:
  • José Renato Haas Ornelas
  • Alvaro Pedraza
  • Claudia Ruiz-Ortega
  • Thiago Christiano Silva

Abstract

We study bank lending when private banks distribute subsidized loans. In Brazil, private banks operate in two credit markets: a competitive free market and an earmarked market characterized by government-funded loans at below-market interest rates. We find that banks are more likely to extend earmarked loans to larger firms and firms with existing relationships. We further document a novel cross-selling strategy whereby banks increase the price of free-market loans for riskier borrowers that obtain earmarked credit.

Suggested Citation

  • José Renato Haas Ornelas & Alvaro Pedraza & Claudia Ruiz-Ortega & Thiago Christiano Silva, 2021. "Credit Allocation When Private Banks Distribute Government Loans," Working Papers Series 548, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:bcb:wpaper:548
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bcb.gov.br/content/publicacoes/WorkingPaperSeries/wps548.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1995. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(2), pages 407-443.
    2. Ayako Yasuda, 2005. "Do Bank Relationships Affect the Firm's Underwriter Choice in the Corporate‐Bond Underwriting Market?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1259-1292, June.
    3. Hans Degryse & Steven Ongena, 2005. "Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(1), pages 231-266, February.
    4. Bonomo, Marco & Brito, Ricardo D. & Martins, Bruno, 2015. "The after crisis government-driven credit expansion in Brazil: A firm level analysis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 111-134.
    5. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-1087, September.
    6. Daniel Carvalho, 2014. "The Real Effects of Government-Owned Banks: Evidence from an Emerging Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(2), pages 577-609, April.
    7. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 554-580, June.
    8. Alexander Ljungqvist & Felicia Marston & William J. Wilhelm, 2006. "Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 301-340, February.
    9. Alexander W. Bartik & Marianne Bertrand & Zoë B. Cullen & Edward L. Glaeser & Michael Luca & Christopher T. Stanton, 2020. "How Are Small Businesses Adjusting to COVID-19? Early Evidence from a Survey," NBER Working Papers 26989, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Sapienza, Paola, 2004. "The effects of government ownership on bank lending," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 357-384, May.
    11. Morais, Bernardo & Peydró, José-Luis & Roldán Peña, Jessica & Ruiz Ortega, Claudia, 2019. "The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Rates and QE: Credit Supply, Reach-for-Yield, and Real Effects," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 74(1), pages 55-90.
    12. Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, 2005. "On the Benefits of Concurrent Lending and Underwriting," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2763-2799, December.
    13. Ornelas, José Renato Haas & da Silva, Marcos Soares & Van Doornik, Bernardus Ferdinandus Nazar, 2022. "Informational switching costs, bank competition, and the cost of finance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    14. Ongena, Steven & Smith, David C., 2001. "The duration of bank relationships," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 449-475, September.
    15. Robert G. King & Ross Levine, 1993. "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(3), pages 717-737.
    16. Ayyagari, Meghana & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Maksimovic, Vojislav, 2011. "Small vs. young firms across the world : contribution to employment, job creation, and growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5631, The World Bank.
    17. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2008. "Tracing the Impact of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from an Emerging Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1413-1442, September.
    18. von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2004. "Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: the winner's curse," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 11-23, March.
    19. I. Serdar Dinc & Nandini Gupta, 2011. "The Decision to Privatize: Finance and Politics," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(1), pages 241-269, February.
    20. Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "Financial Dependence and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 559-586, June.
    21. Bharath, Sreedhar & Dahiya, Sandeep & Saunders, Anthony & Srinivasan, Anand, 2007. "So what do I get? The bank's view of lending relationships," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 368-419, August.
    22. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1995. "Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 351-381, July.
    23. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2005. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1371-1411.
    24. Vasso Ioannidou & Steven Ongena, 2010. "“Time for a Change”: Loan Conditions and Bank Behavior when Firms Switch Banks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(5), pages 1847-1877, October.
    25. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    26. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
    27. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-1400, September.
    28. John Haltiwanger & Ron S. Jarmin & Javier Miranda, 2013. "Who Creates Jobs? Small versus Large versus Young," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(2), pages 347-361, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fonseca, Julia & Matray, Adrien, 2024. "Financial inclusion, economic development, and inequality: Evidence from Brazil," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    2. Thiago Christiano Silva & Sergio Rubens Stancato de Souza & Solange Maria Guerra, 2021. "COVID-19 and Local Market Power in Credit Markets," Working Papers Series 558, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Keil, Jan, 2023. "Lending relationships when creditors are in control," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    2. Olivier De Jonghe & Hans Dewachter & Klaas Mulier & Steven Ongena & Glenn Schepens, 2020. "Some Borrowers Are More Equal than Others: Bank Funding Shocks and Credit Reallocation [A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(1), pages 1-43.
    3. Santikian, Lori, 2014. "The ties that bind: Bank relationships and small business lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 177-213.
    4. Song Zhang & Liang Han & Konstantinos Kallias & Antonios Kallias, 2022. "Bank switching of US small businesses: new methods and evidence," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 1573-1616, May.
    5. Gabriel J. Power & Djerry C. Mbianda Tandja, 2022. "Should lenders also advise? Evidence from project loans," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 961-985, December.
    6. Steven Poelhekke & Razvan Vlahu & Vadym Volosovych, 2021. "Corporate Acquisitions and Bank Relationships," Working Papers 726, DNB.
    7. Alessandro Gambini & Alberto Zazzaro, 2013. "Long-lasting bank relationships and growth of firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 977-1007, May.
    8. Kirschenmann, K., 2010. "The Dynamics in Requested and Granted Loan Terms when Bank and Borrower Interact Repeatedly," Other publications TiSEM 40d5005c-1626-4511-aa8a-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Wenlian Gao & Feifei Zhu & Kai Chen, 2023. "The role of bank lenders in firm leverage adjustments," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 63-97, February.
    10. Kirschenmann, K., 2010. "The Dynamics in Requested and Granted Loan Terms when Bank and Borrower Interact Repeatedly," Discussion Paper 2010-63, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Choudhary, M. Ali & Jain, Anil, 2022. "Finance and inequality: The distributional impacts of bank credit rationing," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    12. López-Espinosa, Germán & Mayordomo, Sergio & Moreno, Antonio, 2017. "When does relationship lending start to pay?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 16-29.
    13. Yasuda, Ayako, 2007. "Bank relationships and underwriter competition: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 369-404, November.
    14. Lončarski, Igor & Marinč, Matej, 2020. "The political economy of relationship banking," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    15. Marcello Pagnini & Paola Rossi & Valerio Vacca & Iftekhar Hasan & Liuling Liu & Haizhi Wang & Xinting Zhen, 2017. "Bank Market Power and Loan Contracts: Empirical Evidence," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 46(3), pages 649-676, November.
    16. Paravisini, Daniel & Rappoport, Veronica & Schnabl, Philipp, 2023. "Specialization in bank lending: evidence from exporting firms," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119458, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Ferri, Giovanni & Murro, Pierluigi, 2015. "Do firm–bank ‘odd couples’ exacerbate credit rationing?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 231-251.
    18. Imai, Masami, 2012. "Local economic effects of a government-owned depository institution: Evidence from a natural experiment in Japan," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-22.
    19. Huang, Jiayi & Matthews, Kent & Zhou, Peng, 2020. "What causes Chinese listed firms to switch bank loan provider? Evidence from a survival analysis," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).
    20. Rosenfeld, Claire M., 2014. "The effect of banking relationships on the future of financially distressed firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 403-418.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bcb:wpaper:548. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Rodrigo Barbone Gonzalez (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.bcb.gov.br/en .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.