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Cyber Risk and Security Investment

Author

Listed:
  • Toni Ahnert
  • Michael Brolley
  • David Cimon
  • Ryan Riordan

Abstract

We develop a model in which firms invest in cybersecurity to protect themselves and their clients from cyber attacks. Since cyber security investment is unobservable, firms may signal their investment to attract clients. In equilibrium, firms under-invest in cyber security. We derive testable implications for the modality of cyber attacks, the probability of a successful attack, and client fees. To improve efficiency, a regulator can impose a minimum level of security investment or legislate consumer protection that shifts the burden of cyber attacks from clients to firms. Both regulations induce firms to invest the constrained-efficient amount in cyber security.

Suggested Citation

  • Toni Ahnert & Michael Brolley & David Cimon & Ryan Riordan, 2022. "Cyber Risk and Security Investment," Staff Working Papers 22-32, Bank of Canada.
    • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:22-32
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anna Cartwright & Edward Cartwright & Jamie MacColl & Gareth Mott & Sarah Turner & James Sullivan & Jason R. C. Nurse, 2023. "How cyber insurance influences the ransomware payment decision: theory and evidence," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 48(2), pages 300-331, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic models; Financial services; Financial stability; Financial system regulation and policies; Payment clearing and settlement systems;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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