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Acces as a Motivational Device: Implications for Human Resource Management

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Arocena
  • Mikel Villanueva

    (Universidad Pública de Navarra)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the employment relationship on the basis of the notion of access. We argue that the degree of access provided by a job is an incentive to activate the employee’s self-actualization needs. We investigate the effect of access on the workers’ performance through an agency model and provide a number of propositions with practical implications for personnel policies. Our results are consistent with the intuition emerged from the real business practice as well as with many of the arguments on the substitutive role between monetary and non-monetary incentives frequently reported in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Arocena & Mikel Villanueva, 2002. "Acces as a Motivational Device: Implications for Human Resource Management," Working Papers 0201, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Jan 2002.
    • Handle: RePEc:bbe:wpaper:0201
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012. "Personnel Economics [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    2. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    3. Rotemberg, Julio J, 1994. "Human Relations in the Workplace," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 684-717, August.
    4. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, December.
    5. Paul Osterman, 2000. "Work Reorganization in an Era of Restructuring: Trends in Diffusion and Effects on Employee Welfare," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 53(2), pages 179-196, January.
    6. Bruno S. Frey, 1997. "Not Just for the Money," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1183.
    7. Frey, Bruno S., 1997. "On the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic work motivation1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 427-439, July.
    8. Kreps, David M, 1997. "Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 359-364, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Lisa Mainiero & Kevin Jones, 2013. "Workplace Romance 2.0: Developing a Communication Ethics Model to Address Potential Sexual Harassment from Inappropriate Social Media Contacts Between Coworkers," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 114(2), pages 367-379, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Access; Agency Theory; Employment Relationship; Intrinsic Motivation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General

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