The "German Vote" and its consequences: (Un)reliable parties in multilateral bargaining under private information
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More about this item
Keywords
bargaining; majority; unanimity; unreliability; private information;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2025-01-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2025-01-20 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2025-01-20 (Microeconomics)
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