Unanimity under Ambiguity
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert & Addison Pan & Matthew Ryan, 2021. "Unanimity under Ambiguity," Working Papers 2021-07, Auckland University of Technology, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
- McLennan, Andrew, 1998. "Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 413-418, June.
- Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt & Katri K. Sieberg & Allison L. Oldham, 2015. "An Experimental Study of Jury Voting Behavior," Studies in Political Economy, in: Norman Schofield & Gonzalo Caballero (ed.), The Political Economy of Governance, edition 127, pages 157-178, Springer.
- S. Nageeb Ali & Jacob K. Goeree & Navin Kartik & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2008. "Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 181-186, May.
- Addison Pan, 2019. "A Note on Pivotality," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-8, June.
- ,, 2011.
"Dynamic choice under ambiguity,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(3), September.
- Marciano Siniscalchi, 2006. "Dynamic Choice Under Ambiguity," Discussion Papers 1430, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Leeat Yariv, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 893-921, May.
- Matthew Ryan, 2021. "Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 543-577, May.
- Guarnaschelli, Serena & McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2000. "An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 407-423, June.
- Coughlan, Peter J., 2000. "In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 375-393, June.
- ,, 2016. "Condorcet meets Ellsberg," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
- Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert & Addison Pan & Matthew Ryan, 2022. "A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 399-425, October.
- Young, H. P., 1988. "Condorcet's Theory of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 1231-1244, December.
- Feddersen, Timothy & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(1), pages 23-35, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert & Addison Pan & Matthew Ryan, 2022. "A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 399-425, October.
- Matthew Ryan, 2021. "Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 543-577, May.
- Matthew Ryan, 2019. "Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg," Working Papers 2019-07, Auckland University of Technology, Department of Economics.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016.
"Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_20, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Castanheira, Micael & Bouton, Laurent & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 9234, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira & Aniol Llorente-Saguer, 2015. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 777, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Micael Castanheira De Moura & Laurent Bouton & A. Llorente-Saguer, 2016. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/242105, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert & Addison Pan & Matthew Ryan, 2022. "A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 399-425, October.
- Kawamura, Kohei & Vlaseros, Vasileios, 2017. "Expert information and majority decisions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 77-88.
- Jianan Wang, 2021. "Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 515-531, December.
- Morton, Rebecca B. & Piovesan, Marco & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2019.
"The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 461-481.
- Rebecca B. Morton & Marco Piovesan & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2012. "The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting," Harvard Business School Working Papers 13-017, Harvard Business School.
- Morton, Rebecca B. & Piovesan, Marco & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2013. "The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-209, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Rebecca B. Morton & Marco Piovesan & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2012. "The Dark Side of the Vote - Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting," Discussion Papers 12-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Tyran, Jean-Robert & Morton, Rebecca & Piovesan, Marco, 2012. "The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 9098, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Matthew Ryan, 2021. "Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 543-577, May.
- Kohei Kawamura & Vasileios Vlaseros, 2015. "Expert Information and Majority Decisions," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 261, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Yves Breitmoser & Justin Valasek & Justin Mattias Valasek, 2023. "Why Do Committees Work?," CESifo Working Paper Series 10800, CESifo.
- Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2023. "Why do committees work?," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 18/2023, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
- Kohei Kawamura & Vasileios Vlaseros, 2024. "Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 475-492, June.
- Buechel, Berno & Mechtenberg, Lydia, 2019.
"The swing voter's curse in social networks,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 241-268.
- Buechel, Berno & Mechtenberg, Lydia, 2015. "The Swing Voter's Curse in Social Networks," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 29, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
- Buechel, Berno & Mechtenberg, Lydia, 2017. "The Swing Voter's Curse in Social Networks," ETA: Economic Theory and Applications 253218, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Berno Buechel & Lydia Mechtenberg, 2017. "The Swing Voter's Curse in Social Networks," Working Papers 2017.05, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Buechel, Berno & Mechtenberg, Lydia, 2017. "The swing voter's curse in social networks," FSES Working Papers 485, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
- Mechtenberg, Lydia & Büchel, Berno, 2017. "The Swing Voter's Curse in Social Networks," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168094, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Marcello Puca & Krista Jabs Saral & Simone M. Sepe, 2023. "The Value of Consensus. An Experimental Analysis of Costly Deliberation," CSEF Working Papers 680, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Quement, Mark T. Le & Marcin, Isabel, 2020. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 449-468.
- Youzong Xu, 2019. "Collective decision-making of voters with heterogeneous levels of rationality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 267-287, January.
- Cesar Martinelli & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2017. "Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results," Working Papers 1065, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Marina Agranov & Jacob K Goeree & Julian Romero & Leeat Yariv, 2018.
"What Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and Beliefs,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 825-856.
- Marina Agranov & Jacob K. Goeree & Julian Romero & Leeat Yariv, 2012. "What makes voters turn out: the effects of polls and beliefs," ECON - Working Papers 067, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Agranov, Marina & Goeree, Jacob K. & Romero, Julian & Yariv, Leeat, 2016. "What makes voters turn out: The effects of polls and beliefs," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2016-206, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2017. "A rationale for unanimity in committees," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-308, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Bougheas, Spiros & Nieboer, Jeroen & Sefton, Martin, 2015.
"Risk taking and information aggregation in groups,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 34-47.
- Spiros Bougheas & Jeroen Nieboerr & Martin Sefton, 2014. "Risk Taking and Information Aggregation in Groups," Discussion Papers 2014-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Bougheas, Spiro & Nieboer, Jeroen & Sefton, Martin, 2015. "Risk taking and information aggregation in groups," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64085, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Spiros Bougheas & Jeroen Nieboer & Martin Sefton, 2015. "Risk Taking and Information Aggregation in Groups," Discussion Papers 2015-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Matthew Ryan, 2019. "Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg," Working Papers 2019-07, Auckland University of Technology, Department of Economics.
- Mark T. Le Quement & Isabel Marcin, 2016. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Oct 2016.
More about this item
Keywords
: ambiguous priors; voting problems; decision quality;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2024-03-25 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2024-03-25 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2024-03-25 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aut:wpaper:2024-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Gail Pacheco (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fbautnz.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.