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On the joint production of research and training

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  • António Freitas
  • Inés Macho-Stadler

Abstract

Universities and research institutions have the responsibility to produce science and to provide training to new generations of researchers. In this paper, we propose a model to analyze the determinants of a senior scientist's decisions about allocating time between these tasks. The results of this decision depend upon the characteristics of the research project, the senior scientist's concern for training and the expected innate ability of the junior scientist involved. We analyze the role that a regulator can play in defining both the value of scientific projects and the future population of independent scientists.

Suggested Citation

  • António Freitas & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2011. "On the joint production of research and training," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 861.11, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:861.11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alexis Walckiers, 2008. "Multi-dimensional contracts with task-specific productivity: an application to universities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(2), pages 165-198, April.
    2. António Freitas & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2014. "On the joint production of research and training," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 13(2), pages 71-94, August.
    3. Alexis Walckiers, 2008. "Multi-dimensional contracts with task-specific productivity: An application to universities," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/101641, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Murray, Fiona, 2004. "The role of academic inventors in entrepreneurial firms: sharing the laboratory life," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 643-659, May.
    5. Banal-Estanol, A. & Macho-Stadler, I., 2008. "Commercial Incentives in Academia," Working Papers 08/13, Department of Economics, City University London.
    6. Albert Banal‐Estañol & Inés Macho‐Stadler, 2010. "Scientific and Commercial Incentives in R&D: Research versus Development?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 185-221, March.
    7. N. Lacetera & L. Zirulia, 2008. "Knowledge Spillovers, Competition, and R&D Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 624, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    8. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
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    Cited by:

    1. António Freitas & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2014. "On the joint production of research and training," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 13(2), pages 71-94, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Allocation of time between tasks; research and training; senior and junior scientists;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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