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Outsourcing and Audit Risk for Internal Audit Services

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  • DENNIS H. CAPLAN
  • MICHAEL KIRSCHENHEITER

Abstract

Some companies now outsource their internal audit function to public accountants. Internal auditors and accounting firms disagree about the merits of outsourcing. Each type of auditor claims to provide more cost†effective services and appears to claim superior expertise. This paper uses agency theory to examine outsourcing and reconciles the outsourcing debate without resorting to differential auditor expertise. Under the assumptions that public accountants' “deep pockets†provide incentives to outsource and their higher opportunity cost provides a disincentive, we characterize the optimal employment contract with each auditor. We find that public accountants provide higher levels of testing, but possibly for a higher expected fee. This result supports both the internal auditor's claim as the lower cost provider, and the public accountant's claim of higher quality. We also find that incentives to outsource generally increase in various measures of risk, including the risk that a control weakness exists and the size of the loss that can result from an undetected control weakness.

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  • Dennis H. Caplan & Michael Kirschenheiter, 2000. "Outsourcing and Audit Risk for Internal Audit Services," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(3), pages 387-428, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:387-428
    DOI: 10.1506/8CP5-XAYG-7U37-H7VR
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    Cited by:

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    2. Abdolmohammadi, Mohammad J. & DeSimone, Steven M. & Hsieh, Tien-Shih & Wang, Zhihong, 2017. "Factors associated with internal audit function involvement with XBRL implementation in public companies: An international study," International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 45-56.
    3. Martin Mutschmann & Tim Hasso & Matthias Pelster, 2022. "Dark Triad Managerial Personality and Financial Reporting Manipulation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 763-788, December.
    4. Paolo Candio, 2023. "On the role of cost-effectiveness in accounting," MANAGEMENT CONTROL, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2023(2 Suppl.), pages 215-225.
    5. Awn Metlib Al-Shbail & Turki A. A. Turki, 2017. "A Theoretical Discussion of Internal Audit Effectiveness in Kuwaiti Industrial SMEs," International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, vol. 7(1), pages 107-116, January.
    6. Dean Neu & Jeff Everett & Abu Shiraz Rahaman, 2013. "Internal Auditing and Corruption within Government: The Case of the Canadian Sponsorship Program," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(3), pages 1223-1250, September.
    7. Speklé, R.F. & van Elten, H.J. & Kruis, A.M., 2005. "Sourcing of Internal Auditing: An Empirical Study," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2005-046-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    8. Vikash Kumar Sinha & Marika Arena, 2020. "Manifold Conceptions of the Internal Auditing of Risk Culture in the Financial Sector," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 81-102, February.
    9. Saeed Rabea Baatwah & Adel Ali Al-Qadasi, 2020. "Determinants of outsourced internal audit function: a further analysis," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 10(4), pages 629-659, December.
    10. Smith, Julia A. & Morris, Jonathan & Ezzamel, Mahmoud, 2005. "Organisational change, outsourcing and the impact on management accounting," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 415-441.

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