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Keynesian Beauty Contest in Morocco's Public Procurement Reform

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  • Nizar Riane

Abstract

This paper examines the recent reform of Morocco's public procurement market through the lens of Keynesian beauty contest theory. The reform introduces a mechanism akin to a guessing-the-average game, where bidders attempt to estimate a reference price, which in turn impacts bidding strategies. We utilize this setup to empirically test key hypotheses within auction theory, specifically the roles of common knowledge and bounded rationality. Our findings indicate potential manipulation risks under the current rules, suggesting that a shift to a median criterion could improve robustness and reduce the likelihood of manipulation. This work contributes to the broader understanding of strategic interactions in procurement and offers a foundation for future research on improving fairness and efficiency in public contract allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Nizar Riane, 2025. "Keynesian Beauty Contest in Morocco's Public Procurement Reform," Papers 2503.00883, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2503.00883
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.00883
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