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La décroissance des prix au cours d'enchères séquentielles : sources et mesures

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  • Olivier Chanel
  • Stéphanie Vincent

Abstract

[fre] La décroissance des prix au cours d'enchères séquentielles : sources et mesure par Olivier Chanel et Stéphanie Vincent . La tendance des prix au cours d'enchères séquentielles constitue un enjeu d'importance pour l'ensemble des acteurs (acheteurs, vendeurs et commissaires-priseurs) : lorsqu'elle s'avère ne plus suivre une marche aléatoire, elle révèle des opportunités non saisies et constitue alors "une anomalie". . Nous envisageons dans un premier temps les réponses apportées par la théorie des enchères pour expliquer la décroissance mise en évidence dans certaines études empiriques. Ces justifications concernent les hypothèses sur les préférences et les contraintes des acheteurs, mais aussi sur les règles institutionnelles et l'organisation même de l'enchère. Nous examinons ensuite différentes techniques mesurant la tendance des prix dans les enchères séquentielles. Enfin, nous vérifions sur des échantillons simulés et des données d'enchères de vins leur capacité à agréger correctement des variations individuelles de prix. L'utilisation de techniques de rééchantillonnage permet l'étude des propriétés statistiques et la construction de tests. [eng] Decreasing Prices in Sequential Auctions: Sources and Measurement by Olivier Chanel and Stéphanie Vincent . Price trends in sequential auctions are a major issue for all players concerned: buyers, sellers and auctioneers. When price trends no longer follow a random walk pattern, they reveal missed opportunities and therefore constitute an "anomaly." . First we consider the explanations provided by auction theory for the decreasing prices revealed by some empirical studies. These explanations relate to assumptions about the buyers' preferences and constraints, as well as to the institutional rules and the organisation of the auction per se. Then, we look at the various techniques for measuring price trends in sequential auctions. Finally, we use simulated samples and data from wine auctions to verify their ability to aggregate individual price variations correctly. Resampling techniques enable us to analyse statistical properties and construct tests.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Chanel & Stéphanie Vincent, 1998. "La décroissance des prix au cours d'enchères séquentielles : sources et mesures," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 139-157.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5905
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1998.5905
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1998.5905
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Claude Montmarquette & Jacques Robert, 1999. "Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demand: Theory, Experiments and Simulations," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-46, CIRANO.

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