When Do Voters Stop Caring? Estimating the Shape of Voter Utility Function
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2025-01-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2025-01-20 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2025-01-20 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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