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Consistent Conjectures in Dynamic Matching Markets

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  • Laura Doval
  • Pablo Schenone

Abstract

We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they remain unmatched, which we refer to as the agent's conjectures. A collection of conjectures, together with a pairwise stability and individual rationality requirement given the conjectures, defines a solution concept for the economy. We identify a sufficient condition--consistency--for a family of conjectures to lead to a nonempty solution (cf. Hafalir, 2008). As an application, we introduce two families of consistent conjectures and their corresponding solution concepts: continuation-value-respecting dynamic stability, and the extension to dynamic markets of the solution concept in Hafalir (2008), sophisticated dynamic stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Laura Doval & Pablo Schenone, 2024. "Consistent Conjectures in Dynamic Matching Markets," Papers 2407.04857, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2407.04857
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kotowski, Maciej, 2019. "A Perfectly Robust Approach to Multiperiod Matching Problems," Working Paper Series rwp19-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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