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Coevolution of Resource and Strategies in Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas: A Coupled Human-Environmental System Model

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  • Chengyi Tu
  • Renfei Chen
  • Ying Fan
  • Yongliang Yang

Abstract

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

Suggested Citation

  • Chengyi Tu & Renfei Chen & Ying Fan & Yongliang Yang, 2024. "Coevolution of Resource and Strategies in Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas: A Coupled Human-Environmental System Model," Papers 2401.11269, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2401.11269
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