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Call the Dentist! A (Con-)Cavity in the Value of Information

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  • Mark Whitmeyer

Abstract

A natural way of quantifying the ``amount of information'' in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information. Another (in contrast, adversarial) way almost never does.

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  • Mark Whitmeyer, 2024. "Call the Dentist! A (Con-)Cavity in the Value of Information," Papers 2404.01190, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2404.01190
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mark Whitmeyer, 2022. "Making Information More Valuable," Papers 2210.04418, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    2. Michel de Lara & L. Gilotte, 2007. "A tight sufficient condition for Radner-Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information," Post-Print hal-00716396, HAL.
    3. Chade, Hector & Schlee, Edward, 2002. "Another Look at the Radner-Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 421-452, December.
    4. De Lara, Michel & Gilotte, Laurent, 2007. "A tight sufficient condition for Radner-Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 696-708, November.
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