A tight sufficient condition for Radner-Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information
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- Chade, Hector & Schlee, Edward, 2002. "Another Look at the Radner-Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 421-452, December.
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Cited by:
- Michel de Lara & Olivier Gossner, 2020. "Payoffs-Beliefs Duality and the Value of Information," Post-Print hal-01941006, HAL.
- Mark Whitmeyer, 2024. "Call the Dentist! A (Con-)Cavity in the Value of Information," Papers 2404.01190, arXiv.org.
- Mark Whitmeyer, 2024. "Can One Hear the Shape of a Decision Problem?," Papers 2403.06344, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
- Mark Whitmeyer, 2022. "Making Information More Valuable," Papers 2210.04418, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
- van Staden, Heletjé E. & Boute, Robert N., 2021. "The effect of multi-sensor data on condition-based maintenance policies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 290(2), pages 585-600.
- Peter I. Frazier & Warren B. Powell, 2010. "Paradoxes in Learning and the Marginal Value of Information," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 378-403, December.
- Michel De Lara & Olivier Gossner, 2017. "An instrumental approach to the value of information," Working Papers 2017-49, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
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