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AI Oversight and Human Mistakes: Evidence from Centre Court

Author

Listed:
  • David Almog
  • Romain Gauriot
  • Lionel Page
  • Daniel Martin

Abstract

Powered by the increasing predictive capabilities of machine learning algorithms, artificial intelligence (AI) systems have begun to be used to overrule human mistakes in many settings. We provide the first field evidence this AI oversight carries psychological costs that can impact human decision-making. We investigate one of the highest visibility settings in which AI oversight has occurred: the Hawk-Eye review of umpires in top tennis tournaments. We find that umpires lowered their overall mistake rate after the introduction of Hawk-Eye review, in line with rational inattention given psychological costs of being overruled by AI. We also find that umpires increased the rate at which they called balls in, which produced a shift from making Type II errors (calling a ball out when in) to Type I errors (calling a ball in when out). We structurally estimate the psychological costs of being overruled by AI using a model of rational inattentive umpires, and our results suggest that because of these costs, umpires cared twice as much about Type II errors under AI oversight.

Suggested Citation

  • David Almog & Romain Gauriot & Lionel Page & Daniel Martin, 2024. "AI Oversight and Human Mistakes: Evidence from Centre Court," Papers 2401.16754, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2401.16754
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