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Cooperating with the future

Author

Listed:
  • Oliver P. Hauser

    (Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University
    Harvard University)

  • David G. Rand

    (Yale University
    Yale University)

  • Alexander Peysakhovich

    (Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University
    Yale University)

  • Martin A. Nowak

    (Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University
    Harvard University
    Harvard University)

Abstract

An intergenerational cooperation game has been developed to study decision-making regarding resource use: when decisions about resource extraction were made individually the resource was rapidly depleted by a minority of defectors; the resource was sustainably maintained across generations, however, when decisions were made democratically by voting.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver P. Hauser & David G. Rand & Alexander Peysakhovich & Martin A. Nowak, 2014. "Cooperating with the future," Nature, Nature, vol. 511(7508), pages 220-223, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:nature:v:511:y:2014:i:7508:d:10.1038_nature13530
    DOI: 10.1038/nature13530
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    References listed on IDEAS

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