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The Machine Psychology of Cooperation: Can GPT models operationalise prompts for altruism, cooperation, competitiveness and selfishness in economic games?

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  • Steve Phelps
  • Yvan I. Russell

Abstract

We investigated the capability of the GPT-3.5 large language model (LLM) to operationalize natural language descriptions of cooperative, competitive, altruistic, and self-interested behavior in two social dilemmas: the repeated Prisoners Dilemma and the one-shot Dictator Game. Using a within-subject experimental design, we used a prompt to describe the task environment using a similar protocol to that used in experimental psychology studies with human subjects. We tested our research question by manipulating the part of our prompt which was used to create a simulated persona with different cooperative and competitive stances. We then assessed the resulting simulacras' level of cooperation in each social dilemma, taking into account the effect of different partner conditions for the repeated game. Our results provide evidence that LLMs can, to some extent, translate natural language descriptions of different cooperative stances into corresponding descriptions of appropriate task behaviour, particularly in the one-shot game. There is some evidence of behaviour resembling conditional reciprocity for the cooperative simulacra in the repeated game, and for the later version of the model there is evidence of altruistic behaviour. Our study has potential implications for using LLM chatbots in task environments that involve cooperation, e.g. using chatbots as mediators and facilitators in public-goods negotiations.

Suggested Citation

  • Steve Phelps & Yvan I. Russell, 2023. "The Machine Psychology of Cooperation: Can GPT models operationalise prompts for altruism, cooperation, competitiveness and selfishness in economic games?," Papers 2305.07970, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2305.07970
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    1. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Third Party Punishment and Social Norms," IEW - Working Papers 106, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kirshner, Samuel N., 2024. "GPT and CLT: The impact of ChatGPT's level of abstraction on consumer recommendations," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    2. Philip Brookins & Jason DeBacker, 2024. "Playing games with GPT: What can we learn about a large language model from canonical strategic games?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 44(1), pages 25-37.
    3. Christoph Engel & Max R. P. Grossmann & Axel Ockenfels, 2023. "Integrating machine behavior into human subject experiments: A user-friendly toolkit and illustrations," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2024_01, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    4. Nunzio Lor`e & Babak Heydari, 2023. "Strategic Behavior of Large Language Models: Game Structure vs. Contextual Framing," Papers 2309.05898, arXiv.org.

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