Description Complexity of Regular Distributions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-194, March.
- Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983.
"Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1981.
"Optimal Auction Design,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Amine Allouah & Omar Besbes, 2020. "Prior-Independent Optimal Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(10), pages 4417-4432, October.
- L. Elisa Celis & Gregory Lewis & Markus Mobius & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2014.
"Buy-It-Now or Take-a-Chance: Price Discrimination Through Randomized Auctions,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(12), pages 2927-2948, December.
- L. Elisa Celis & Gregory Lewis & Markus M. Mobius & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2012. "Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions," NBER Working Papers 18590, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2009.
"Preferred suppliers in auction markets,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 283-295, June.
- Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2008. "Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 752.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2008. "Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets," Working Papers 355, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene) & Lee, Joosung, 2024. "The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 191-203.
- Moshe Babaioff & Kira Goldner & Yannai A. Gonczarowski, 2019. "Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets," Papers 1903.06696, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2019.
- Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2019. "Merger review with intermediate buyer power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
- Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2021. "Coordinated Effects in Merger Review," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(4), pages 705-744.
- McAfee, R. Preston & Vincent, Daniel, 1997.
"Sequentially Optimal Auctions,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 246-276, February.
- R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1994. "Sequentially Optimal Auctions," Discussion Papers 1104, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bradley J Larsen, 2021.
"The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 851-882.
- Bradley Larsen, 2014. "The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions," NBER Working Papers 20431, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yiding Feng & Yaonan Jin, 2024. "Beyond Regularity: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms, Revisited," Papers 2411.03583, arXiv.org.
- Maslov, Alexander & Noiset, Luc & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2022. "A closer look at two conjectures about irregular marginal revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
- Scott Fay & Robert Zeithammer, 2017. "Bidding for Bidders? How the Format for Soliciting Supplier Participation in NYOP Auctions Impacts Channel Profit," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(12), pages 4324-4344, December.
- Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017.
"An invitation to market design,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
- Scott Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent Crawford, 2017. "An Invitation to Market Design," Working Papers 2017-069, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017. "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3xp2110t, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Stefano Galavotti, 2014.
"Reducing Inefficiency in Public Good Provision Through Linking,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 427-466, June.
- Stefano Galavotti, 2010. "Reducing inefficiency in public good provision through linking," Working Papers - Mathematical Economics 2010-01, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Jean-Michel Benkert, 2015.
"Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents,"
ECON - Working Papers
188, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2022.
- Jean-Michel Benkert, 2022. "Bilateral Trade with Loss-Averse Agents," Diskussionsschriften dp2203, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias, 2013.
"Extremal incentive compatible transfers,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 134-164.
- Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2010. "Extremal Incentive Compatible Transfers," Working Papers 359, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Wei He & Jiangtao Li & Weijie Zhong, 2024. "Rank-Guaranteed Auctions," Papers 2408.12001, arXiv.org.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003.
"On second-price auctions and imperfect competition,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 901-909, November.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 3774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006.
"Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021.
"A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
- Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2020. "A Dominant Strategy, Double Clock Auction with Estimation-Based Tatonnement," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1249, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002.
"On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 177-189, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 12532, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yuen Leng Chow & Isa E. Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, 2015.
"Auction versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales,"
Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 432-470, June.
- YuenLeng Chow & Isa Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, "undated". "Auctions versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E22, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
More about this item
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2023-05-29 (Economic Design)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2305.05590. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.