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Valuing Pharmaceutical Drug Innovations

Author

Listed:
  • Gaurab Aryal
  • Federico Ciliberto
  • Leland E. Farmer
  • Ekaterina Khmelnitskaya

Abstract

We propose a methodology to estimate the market value of pharmaceutical drugs. Our approach combines an event study with a model of discounted cash flows and uses stock market responses to drug development announcements to infer the values. We estimate that, on average, a successful drug is valued at \$1.62 billion, and its value at the discovery stage is \$64.3 million, with substantial heterogeneity across major diseases. Leveraging these estimates, we also determine the average drug development costs at various stages. Furthermore, we explore applying our estimates to design policies that support drug development through drug buyouts and cost-sharing agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaurab Aryal & Federico Ciliberto & Leland E. Farmer & Ekaterina Khmelnitskaya, 2022. "Valuing Pharmaceutical Drug Innovations," Papers 2212.07384, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2212.07384
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    References listed on IDEAS

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