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Discrimination in Heterogeneous Games

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  • Annick Laruelle
  • Andr'e Rocha

Abstract

In this paper, we consider coordination and anti-coordination heterogeneous games played by a finite population formed by different types of individuals who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. We show that there exists symmetric Nash equilibria in which players discriminate by acting differently according to the type of opponent that they face in anti-coordination games, while no such equilibrium exists in coordination games. Moreover, discrimination has a limit: the maximum number of groups where the treatment differs is three. We then discuss the theoretical results in light of the observed behavior of people in some specific psychological contexts.

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  • Annick Laruelle & Andr'e Rocha, 2022. "Discrimination in Heterogeneous Games," Papers 2206.05087, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2206.05087
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. W. Brian Arthur, 1994. "Inductive Reasoning, Bounded Rationality and the Bar Problem," Working Papers 94-03-014, Santa Fe Institute.
    2. Arthur, W Brian, 1994. "Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 406-411, May.
    3. André Barreira Da Silva Rocha & Annick Laruelle, 2013. "Evolution Of Cooperation In The Snowdrift Game With Heterogeneous Population," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(08), pages 1-19.
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