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Evolution Of Cooperation In The Snowdrift Game With Heterogeneous Population

Author

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  • ANDRÉ BARREIRA DA SILVA ROCHA

    (Department of Economics, University of Leicester, Astley Clarke Building, University Road, Leicester LE1 7RH, United Kingdom;
    Department of Industrial Engineering, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Jareiro, Rua Marquês de São Vicente, 225 CEP 22451-900, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil)

  • ANNICK LARUELLE

    (BRiDGE, Foundation of Economic Analysis I, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83, E-48015 Bilbao, Spain;
    IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation of Science, 48011, Bilbao, Spain)

Abstract

Different from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.

Suggested Citation

  • André Barreira Da Silva Rocha & Annick Laruelle, 2013. "Evolution Of Cooperation In The Snowdrift Game With Heterogeneous Population," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(08), pages 1-19.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:16:y:2013:i:08:n:s0219525913500367
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219525913500367
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    Cited by:

    1. André Barreira Da Silva Rocha, 2017. "Cooperation In The Well-Mixed Two-Population Snowdrift Game With Punishment Enforced Through Different Mechanisms," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(04n05), pages 1-21, June.
    2. Annick Laruelle & Andr'e Rocha, 2022. "Discrimination in Heterogeneous Games," Papers 2206.05087, arXiv.org.

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