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The Power Of Knowledge In Games

Author

Listed:
  • ROHIT PARIKH

    (Doctoral Program in Computer Science, Graduate Center of the City University of New York, USA;
    Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, USA;
    Graduate Center of the City University of New York, 365 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10016, USA)

  • ÇAĞIL TAŞDEMİR

    (Graduate Center of the City University of New York, 365 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10016, USA)

  • ANDREAS WITZEL

    (Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University, 251 Mercer Street New York, NY 10012, USA)

Abstract

We propose a theory of the interaction between knowledge and games. Epistemic game theory is of course a well-developed subject but there is also a need for a theory of how some agents canaffectthe outcome of a game by affecting the knowledge which other agents have and thereby affecting their actions. We concentrate on games of incomplete or imperfect information, and study how conservative, moderate, or aggressive players might play such games. We provide models for the behavior of a knowledge manipulator who seeks to manipulate the knowledge states of active players in order to affect their moves and to maximize her own payoff even while she herself remains inactive, except for influencing the states of knowledge of the other players.

Suggested Citation

  • Rohit Parikh & Çağil Taşdemi̇r & Andreas Witzel, 2013. "The Power Of Knowledge In Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(04), pages 1-28.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:04:n:s0219198913400306
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400306
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Perea,Andrés, 2012. "Epistemic Game Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107401396, September.
    2. Perea,Andrés, 2012. "Epistemic Game Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107008915, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Knowledge; games; manipulation; 91A28;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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