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Corona Games: Masks, Social Distancing and Mechanism Design

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  • Balazs Pejo
  • Gergely Biczok

Abstract

Pandemic response is a complex affair. Most governments employ a set of quasi-standard measures to fight COVID-19 including wearing masks, social distancing, virus testing and contact tracing. We argue that some non-trivial factors behind the varying effectiveness of these measures are selfish decision-making and the differing national implementations of the response mechanism. In this paper, through simple games, we show the effect of individual incentives on the decisions made with respect to wearing masks and social distancing, and how these may result in a sub-optimal outcome. We also demonstrate the responsibility of national authorities in designing these games properly regarding the chosen policies and their influence on the preferred outcome. We promote a mechanism design approach: it is in the best interest of every government to carefully balance social good and response costs when implementing their respective pandemic response mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Balazs Pejo & Gergely Biczok, 2020. "Corona Games: Masks, Social Distancing and Mechanism Design," Papers 2006.06674, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2006.06674
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.06674
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy C Reluga, 2010. "Game Theory of Social Distancing in Response to an Epidemic," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(5), pages 1-9, May.
    2. Peng Sun & Liu Yang & Francis de Véricourt, 2009. "Selfish Drug Allocation for Containing an International Influenza Pandemic at the Onset," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 57(6), pages 1320-1332, December.
    3. Eric S. Maskin, 2008. "Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 567-576, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Mellacher, 2020. "Cooperation in the Age of COVID-19: Evidence from Public Goods Games," Papers 2011.09189, arXiv.org.

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