Efficient democratic decisions via nondeterministic proportional consensus
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- Herve Moulin, 2004. "Fair Division and Collective Welfare," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262633116, December.
- Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), 2010. "Handbook on Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-02839-7, June.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2020-07-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
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