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Mathematical Analysis of Dynamic Risk Default in Microfinance

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  • Mohammed Kaicer
  • Abdelilah Kaddar

Abstract

In this work we will develop a new approach to solve the non repayment problem in microfinance due to the problem of asymmetric information. This approach is based on modeling and simulation of ordinary differential systems where time remains a primordial component, they thus enable microfinance institutions to manage their risk portfolios by a prediction of numbers of solvent and insolvent borrowers ever a period, in order to define or redefine its development strategy, investment and management in an area, where the population is often poor and in need a mechanism of financial inclusion.

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  • Mohammed Kaicer & Abdelilah Kaddar, 2019. "Mathematical Analysis of Dynamic Risk Default in Microfinance," Papers 1907.04937, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1907.04937
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    7. Alexander Tedeschi, Gwendolyn, 2006. "Here today, gone tomorrow: Can dynamic incentives make microfinance more flexible?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 84-105, June.
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