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Commentary: Nash equilibrium and mechanism design

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  • Maskin, Eric

Abstract

I argue that the principal theoretical and practical drawbacks of Nash equilibrium as a solution concept are far less troublesome in problems of mechanism design than in most other applications of game theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Maskin, Eric, 2011. "Commentary: Nash equilibrium and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 9-11, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:9-11
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Filipe Costa Souza & Leandro Chaves Rêgo, 2014. "Mixed Equilibrium, Collaborative Dominance and Burning Money: An Experimental Study," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 377-400, May.
    2. Dmitry Levando, 2021. "Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game," Papers 2107.00711, arXiv.org.
    3. George F. N. Shoukry, 2019. "Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(3), pages 497-526, March.
    4. Dmitry Levando, 2016. "Non-cooperative equilibrium with multiple deviators," Working Papers 2016:15, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    5. Shivam Gupta & Wei Chen & Milind Dawande & Ganesh Janakiraman, 2023. "Three Years, Two Papers, One Course Off: Optimal Nonmonetary Reward Policies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 2852-2869, May.
    6. Dmitry Levando, 2017. "Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17015, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    7. Crawford, Vincent P., 2021. "Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 80-101.
    8. Dmitry Levando, 2017. "Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game," Post-Print halshs-01491935, HAL.
    9. Dmitry Levando, 2017. "Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17015r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised May 2017.
    10. Dmitry Levando, 2017. "Formation of Coalition Structures as a Non-Cooperative Game," HSE Working papers WP BRP 157/EC/2017, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    11. Davoud Taghawi-Nejad & Vipin P. Veetil, 2017. "The Complexity of Coordination," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 260-270, March.
    12. Dmitry Levando, 2017. "Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01491935, HAL.
    13. Mohammed Kaicer & Abdelilah Kaddar, 2019. "Mathematical Analysis of Dynamic Risk Default in Microfinance," Papers 1907.04937, arXiv.org.

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