Price competition with uncertain quality and cost
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982.
"Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
- Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1998. "Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Levine's Working Paper Archive 245, David K. Levine.
- Maarten C.W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2015. "Competition, Disclosure and Signalling," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(582), pages 86-114, February.
- Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 2007.
"Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 94-120, January.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004. "Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly when there is Universal Private Information," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0417, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
- Sander Heinsalu, 2018. "Competitive pricing despite search costs if lower price signals quality," Papers 1806.00898, arXiv.org.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1991.
"Location Models of Horizontal Differentiation: A Special Case of Vertical Differentiation Models,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(4), pages 383-390, June.
- CREMER, Helmuth & THISSE, Jacques-François, 1991. "Location models of horizontal differentiation: a special case of vertical differentiation models," LIDAM Reprints CORE 931, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
- Sengupta, Aditi, 2015.
"Competitive investment in clean technology and uninformed green consumers,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 125-141.
- Aditi Sengupta, 2012. "Competitive Investment in Clean Technology and Uninformed Green Consumers," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2012-08, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
- Spulber, Daniel F, 1995. "Bertrand Competition When Rivals' Costs Are Unknown," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 1-11, March.
- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Sander Heinsalu, 2021. "Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 317-339, February.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Sander Heinsalu, 2021. "Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 317-339, February.
- Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015.
"Industrial Organization,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899.
- Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107069978, September.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2023.
"Competition in costly talk,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Federico Vaccari, 2021. "Competition in Costly Talk," Papers 2103.05317, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2021.
"Competition in Signaling,"
MPRA Paper
106071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Federico Vaccari, 2022. "Competition in Signaling," Working Papers 2022.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Vaccari, Federico, 2022. "Competition in Signaling," FEEM Working Papers 329582, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Dominiak, Adam & Lee, Dongwoo, 2023. "Testing rational hypotheses in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
- Munoz-Garcia Felix & Espinola-Arredondo Ana, 2011. "The Intuitive and Divinity Criterion: Interpretation and Step-by-Step Examples," Journal of Industrial Organization Education, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-20, March.
- Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012.
"Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 39-55.
- Thomas D. Jeitschko & Hans-Theo Normann, 2009. "Signaling in Deterministic and Stochastic Settings," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 09/12, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London.
- Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2011. "Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings," DICE Discussion Papers 35, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Dosis, Anastasios, 2018.
"On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 140-149.
- Anastasios Dosis, 2018. "On Signalling and Screening in Markets with Asymmetric Information," Post-Print hal-02980534, HAL.
- Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2011.
"Can incomplete information lead to under-exploitation in the commons?,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 402-413.
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2010. "Can Incomplete Information Lead to Under-exploitation in the Commons," Working Papers 2010-04, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
- Sexton, Richard J., 1991. "Game Theory: A Review With Applications To Vertical Control In Agricultural Markets," Working Papers 225865, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Kübler, Dorothea & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2008.
"Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 219-236, September.
- Kübler, D. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T., 2003. "Job Market Signalling and Screening : An Experimental Comparison," Discussion Paper 2003-124, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Kübler, Dorothea & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2005. "Job Market Signaling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison," IZA Discussion Papers 1794, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Kübler, D. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T., 2003. "Job Market Signalling and Screening : An Experimental Comparison," Other publications TiSEM f25d3215-6181-4b68-89f9-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Dorothea Kuebler, Wieland Mueller and Hans Normann, 2004. "Job market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/02, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Apr 2004.
- Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2012. "Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1433-1504, July.
- Kaya, Ayça, 2009.
"Repeated signaling games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 841-854, July.
- Ayça Kaya, 2005. "Repeated Signaling Games," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Starkov, Egor, 2023.
"Only time will tell: Credible dynamic signaling,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
- Egor Starkov, 2020. "Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling," Discussion Papers 20-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Egor Starkov, 2020. "Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling," Papers 2007.09568, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
- Chris Y. Tung & Chun-Chieh Wang, 2014. "Cost Signals under Uncertain R&D Outcomes," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3-4), pages 207-229, December.
- Philippe Mahenc, 2017.
"Honest versus Misleading Certification,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 454-483, June.
- Philippe Mahenc, 2015. "Honest versus Misleading Certification," CEEES Paper Series CE3S-06/15, European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics.
- Philippe Mahenc, 2017. "Honest versus misleading certification," Post-Print hal-02043024, HAL.
- Delfgaauw, Josse & Dur, Robert, 2007.
"Signaling and screening of workers' motivation,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 605-624, April.
- Josse Delfgaauw & Robert A.J. Dur, 2002. "Signaling and Screening of Workers' Motivation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-050/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 04 Mar 2005.
- Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2003. "Signaling and Screening of Workers' motivation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1099, CESifo.
- Kim, Jaehong, 2010. "Optimality of Entry Regulation under Incomplete Information," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 51(2), pages 43-58, December.
- Jorge M. Streb, 2018. "Credible signals: A refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibria," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 674, Universidad del CEMA.
- Raymond Deneckere & Sergei Severinov, 2022. "Signalling, screening and costly misrepresentation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1334-1370, August.
More about this item
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2019-03-18 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2019-03-18 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2019-03-18 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1903.03987. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.