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Sander Heinsalu

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First Name:Sander
Middle Name:
Last Name:Heinsalu
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RePEc Short-ID:phe358
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http://sanderheinsalu.com/

Research output

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Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Sander Heinsalu, 2021. "Costlier switching strengthens competition even without advertising," Papers 2104.08934, arXiv.org.
  2. Sander Heinsalu, 2020. "Greater search cost reduces prices," Papers 2004.01238, arXiv.org.
  3. Sander Heinsalu, 2020. "Infection arbitrage," Papers 2004.08701, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2020.
  4. Sander Heinsalu, 2019. "Price competition with uncertain quality and cost," Papers 1903.03987, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2019.
  5. Sander Heinsalu, 2019. "Herding driven by the desire to differ," Papers 1904.00454, arXiv.org.
  6. Sander Heinsalu, 2019. "When abstinence increases prevalence," Papers 1905.02073, arXiv.org.
  7. Sander Heinsalu, 2019. "Reversals of signal-posterior monotonicity imply a bias of screening," Papers 1910.03117, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2019.
  8. Sander Heinsalu, 2018. "Competitive pricing despite search costs if lower price signals quality," Papers 1806.00898, arXiv.org.
  9. Sander Heinsalu, 2018. "Corrigendum to "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective"," Papers 1811.00455, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2018.
  10. Sander Heinsalu, 2017. "Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switching efforts," Papers 1707.04699, arXiv.org.

Articles

  1. Sander Heinsalu, 2023. "Greater search cost reduces prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 923-947, April.
  2. Sander Heinsalu, 2023. "Bounds on the damages from a price overcharge," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 43(3), pages 1265-1270.
  3. Heinsalu, Sander, 2021. "Promotion of (interaction) abstinence increases infection prevalence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 94-112.
  4. Sander Heinsalu, 2021. "Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 317-339, February.
  5. Heinsalu, Sander, 2020. "Investing to access an adverse selection market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
  6. Heinsalu, Sander, 2020. "Reversals of signal-posterior monotonicity imply a bias of screening," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  7. Sander Heinsalu, 2018. "Dynamic Noisy Signaling," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 225-249, May.
  8. Heinsalu, Sander, 2017. "Good signals gone bad: Dynamic signalling with switched effort levels," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 132-141.
  9. Sander Heinsalu, 2016. "Playing for Real Coursepack Edition , by Ken Binmore ( Oxford University Press , New York, NY , 2016 ), pp. xiv + 386 ," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 92(298), pages 508-509, September.
  10. Heinsalu, Sander, 2014. "Universal type structures with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 255-266.
  11. Heinsalu, Sander, 2012. "Equivalence of the information structure with unawareness to the logic of awareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2453-2468.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Sander Heinsalu, 2021. "Costlier switching strengthens competition even without advertising," Papers 2104.08934, arXiv.org.

    Cited by:

    1. Sander Heinsalu, 2020. "Greater search cost reduces prices," Papers 2004.01238, arXiv.org.

  2. Sander Heinsalu, 2020. "Greater search cost reduces prices," Papers 2004.01238, arXiv.org.

    Cited by:

    1. Sander Heinsalu, 2021. "Costlier switching strengthens competition even without advertising," Papers 2104.08934, arXiv.org.

  3. Sander Heinsalu, 2020. "Infection arbitrage," Papers 2004.08701, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2020.

    Cited by:

    1. Jonas Hedlund & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Carlos Oyarzún, 2021. "Contagion Management through Information Disclosure," Discussion Papers Series 651, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.

  4. Sander Heinsalu, 2019. "Price competition with uncertain quality and cost," Papers 1903.03987, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2019.

    Cited by:

    1. Sander Heinsalu, 2021. "Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 317-339, February.

  5. Sander Heinsalu, 2018. "Competitive pricing despite search costs if lower price signals quality," Papers 1806.00898, arXiv.org.

    Cited by:

    1. Sander Heinsalu, 2019. "Price competition with uncertain quality and cost," Papers 1903.03987, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2019.

  6. Sander Heinsalu, 2017. "Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switching efforts," Papers 1707.04699, arXiv.org.

    Cited by:

    1. Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 116-136.
    2. Kolb, Aaron M., 2019. "Strategic real options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 344-383.
    3. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2022. "Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under Censorship," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 506-560, May.

Articles

  1. Sander Heinsalu, 2023. "Greater search cost reduces prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 923-947, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Sander Heinsalu, 2021. "Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 317-339, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Jose A. Carrasco & Rodrigo Yañez, 2022. "Sequential search and firm prominence," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 209-233, July.
    2. Anton, Ramona & Chenavaz, Régis Y. & Paraschiv, Corina, 2023. "Dynamic pricing, reference price, and price-quality relationship," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    3. Joonbae Lee & Hanna Wang, 2023. "Ranking and search effort in matching," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(1), pages 113-136, January.

  3. Heinsalu, Sander, 2020. "Investing to access an adverse selection market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Sarah Auster & Nenad Kos & Salvatore Piccolo, 2021. "Optimal Pricing, Private Information and Search For an Outside Offer," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_151v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    2. Heinsalu, Sander, 2021. "Promotion of (interaction) abstinence increases infection prevalence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 94-112.
    3. Sarah Auster & Nenad Kos & Salvatore Piccolo, 2021. "Optimal pricing, private information and search for an outside offer," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 758-777, December.

  4. Sander Heinsalu, 2018. "Dynamic Noisy Signaling," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 225-249, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 116-136.
    2. Egor Starkov, 2020. "Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling," Papers 2007.09568, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    3. Gonzalo Cisternas & Aaron Kolb, 2020. "Signaling with Private Monitoring," Papers 2007.15514, arXiv.org.
    4. Soeren Johansen & Anders Rygh Swensen, 2021. "Adjustment coefficients and exact rational expectations in cointegrated vector autoregressive models," Discussion Papers 21-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.

  5. Heinsalu, Sander, 2017. "Good signals gone bad: Dynamic signalling with switched effort levels," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 132-141.

    Cited by:

    1. Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 116-136.
    2. Kolb, Aaron M., 2019. "Strategic real options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 344-383.
    3. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2022. "Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under Censorship," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 506-560, May.

  6. Heinsalu, Sander, 2014. "Universal type structures with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 255-266.

    Cited by:

    1. Ganguli, Jayant & Heifetz, Aviad & Lee, Byung Soo, 2016. "Universal interactive preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 237-260.
    2. Burkhard Schipper & Martin Meier, 2013. "Bayesian Games with Unawareness and Unawareness Perfection," Working Papers 304, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. Kets, Willemien, 2021. "Bounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty," SocArXiv qt498, Center for Open Science.
    4. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 100-121.
    5. Karni, Edi & Vierø, Marie-Louise, 2017. "Awareness of unawareness: A theory of decision making in the face of ignorance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 301-328.
    6. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2021. "Unawareness without AU Introspection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    7. Galeazzi, Paolo & Marti, Johannes, 2023. "Choice structures in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 431-455.
    8. Guarino, Pierfrancesco, 2020. "An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 257-288.
    9. Liu, Zhen, 2016. "Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others’ signals," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 58-70.
    10. Paolo Galeazzi & Johannes Marti, 2023. "Choice Structures in Games," Papers 2304.11575, arXiv.org.
    11. Fiorini, Luciana C. & Rodrigues-Neto, José A., 2017. "Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 11-21.
    12. Satoshi Fukuda, 2018. "Representing Unawareness on State Spaces," Working Papers 635, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    13. Perea, Andrés, 2022. "Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 11-30.
    14. Aviad Heifetz & Willemien Kets, 2012. "All Types Naive and Canny," Discussion Papers 1550, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

  7. Heinsalu, Sander, 2012. "Equivalence of the information structure with unawareness to the logic of awareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2453-2468.

    Cited by:

    1. Hsieh, Chia-Chun & Ma, Zhiming & Novoselov, Kirill E., 2019. "Accounting conservatism, business strategy, and ambiguity," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 41-55.
    2. Burkhard Schipper, 2013. "Awareness-dependent subjective expected utility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 725-753, August.
    3. Oliver Walker, 2011. "Unawareness with �possible� possible worlds," GRI Working Papers 69, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    4. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 100-121.
    5. Pintér, Miklós & Udvari, Zsolt, 2011. "Generalized type spaces," MPRA Paper 34107, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Yoshihiko Tada, 2024. "AU Introspection and Symmetry under non-trivial unawareness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 409-421, September.
    7. Gaia Belardinelli & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2023. "Implicit Knowledge in Unawareness Structures," Working Papers 360, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    8. Fiorini, Luciana C. & Rodrigues-Neto, José A., 2017. "Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 11-21.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 7 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (6) 2017-07-23 2018-07-16 2019-03-18 2019-04-08 2020-04-20 2021-04-26. Author is listed
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (4) 2018-07-16 2019-03-18 2020-04-20 2021-04-26
  3. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2018-07-16 2019-03-18
  4. NEP-GEN: Gender (1) 2020-05-11
  5. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2017-07-23

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