Prices as Indicators of Scarcity: An Experimental Study of a Multistage Auction
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- Tanga McDaniel & Andreas Nicklisch, 2004. "Prices as indicators of scarcity - an experimental study of a multistage auction," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-30, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
References listed on IDEAS
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