Institutional Imperfections and Buyer-Induced Holdout in Land Acquisition
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- Sreeparna Saha & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Jaideep Roy & Grazyna Wiejak-Roy, 2021. "Institutional Imperfections and Buyer-Induced Holdout in Land Acquisition," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 177(3), pages 261-298.
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More about this item
Keywords
Land acquisition; institutional imperfections; outside interference; buyer-induced holdout.Sector; Public Sector;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- O25 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Industrial Policy
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2020-12-07 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAW-2020-12-07 (Law and Economics)
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