Optimal mechanism for land acquisition
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00256-5
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More about this item
Keywords
Contiguity; Convergence; Eminent Domain; Land acquisition; Mechanism design; Optimal mechanism; Myerson-Satterthwaite;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
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