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The fruit of inequality: wine, efficiency, agrarian contracts and property rights in Catalonia (1898-1935)

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  • Samuel Garrido

    (Universitat Jaume I, Spain)

Abstract

With the aim of drawing lessons that can act as a reference for reforms in today’s developing countries, economic historians are showing a renewed interest in the European experiences of agrarian reform. But in some developing countries property rights over the land show‘oddities’ with respect to the ‘Western canon’. Drawing on the case of Catalonia, this paper maintains that, if their work is to be useful, historians should be sensitive to the fact that in Europe – including the United Kingdom – oddities were not rare either. In Catalan vineyards, sharecropping contracts that granted the sharecropper ownership rights over the land were in widespread usage. Around 1900, sharecroppers’ rights became insecure, which led to several dysfunctions that the paper analyses.

Suggested Citation

  • Samuel Garrido, 2017. "The fruit of inequality: wine, efficiency, agrarian contracts and property rights in Catalonia (1898-1935)," Documentos de Trabajo (DT-AEHE) 1701, Asociación Española de Historia Económica.
    • Handle: RePEc:ahe:dtaehe:1701
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Samuel Garrido & Salvador Calatayud, 2011. "The price of improvements: agrarian contracts and agrarian development in nineteenth‐century eastern Spain," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 64(2), pages 598-620, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agrarian contracts; Property rights; Catalonia; Wine; Sharecropping; Land reform.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N53 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N54 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: 1913-
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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