IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/uwarer/269593.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

WARFARE AND WELFARE? Understanding 19th and 20th Century Central Government Spending

Author

Listed:
  • Eloranta, Jari

Abstract

This paper evaluates theories aiming to explain the size and growth of government spending, develops a framework inclusive of the so-called guns vs. butter tradeoff effect, and offers insights especially for the period 1870-1938. There were differences between the excessive and responsive government explanations, and between the long-run and short-run explanations, as well as cross-section and time series approaches. Here central government spending, conditioned by the regime characteristics, is proposed to be analyzed on the basis of the demand characteristics of military spending and social spending, their interaction, public debt constraints, as well as institutional constraints and other environmental variables.

Suggested Citation

  • Eloranta, Jari, 2004. "WARFARE AND WELFARE? Understanding 19th and 20th Century Central Government Spending," Economic Research Papers 269593, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269593
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269593
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269593/files/twerp699.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269593/files/twerp699.pdf?subformat=pdfa
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.269593?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tanzi,Vito & Schuknecht,Ludger, 2000. "Public Spending in the 20th Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521662918, October.
    2. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson, 1998. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," International Economic Association Series, in: Silvio Borner & Martin Paldam (ed.), The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, chapter 3, pages 38-73, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. Timothy J. Hatton & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2002. "What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?," NBER Working Papers 9159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2002. "Winners and Losers Over Two Centuries of Globalization," NBER Working Papers 9161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Barr, Nicholas, 1992. "Economic theory and the welfare state : a survey and interpretation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 279, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1999. "The Political Economy of NATO," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521630931, October.
    7. Huberman, Michael & Lewchuk, Wayne, 2003. "European economic integration and the labour compact, 1850–1913," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 3-41, April.
    8. Kraan,Dirk-Jan, 1996. "Budgetary Decisions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521558679, October.
    9. Alan T. Peacock & Jack Wiseman, 1961. "The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number peac61-1.
    10. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
    11. Sandler, Todd & Hartley, Keith, 1999. "The Political Economy of Nato: Past, Present, and into the 21st Century," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1441, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    12. Offer, Avner, 2003. "Why has the Public Sector Grown so Large in Market Societies?: The Political Economy of Prudence in the UK, c.1870-2000," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199514359.
    13. Lindert, Peter H., 2003. "Voice and Growth: Was Churchill Right?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(02), pages 315-350, June.
    14. Lindert Peter H., 1994. "The Rise of Social Spending, 1880-1930," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 1-37, January.
    15. Barr, Nicholas, 1992. "Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 741-803, June.
    16. Kormendi, Roger C, 1983. "Government Debt, Government Spending, and Private Sector Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 994-1010, December.
    17. Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-I-Martin, 1992. "Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 645-661.
    18. Hjerppe, Reino, "undated". "Provision of Public and Merit Goods Towards an Optimal Policy Mix?," WIDER Working Papers 295352, United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    19. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185, October.
    20. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
    21. Blejer, Mario I & Cheasty, Adrienne, 1991. "The Measurement of Fiscal Deficits: Analytical and Methodological Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 29(4), pages 1644-1678, December.
    22. Peter Lindert, 2004. "Social Spending and Economic Growth," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(4), pages 6-16.
    23. Kraan,Dirk-Jan, 1996. "Budgetary Decisions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521418713, October.
    24. Offer, Avner, 2003. "Why has the Public Sector Grown so Large in Market Societies?: The Political Economy of Prudence in the UK, c.1870-2000," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199514359.
    25. Rasler, Karen A. & Thompson, William R., 1985. "War Making and State Making: Governmental Expenditures, Tax Revenues, and Global Wars," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 491-507, June.
    26. Lindert, Peter H., 2003. "Voice and Growth: Was Churchill Right?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 315-350, June.
    27. Liebowitz, S J & Margolis, Stephen E, 1990. "The Fable of the Keys," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 1-25, April.
    28. Sandler,Todd & Hartley,Keith, 1995. "The Economics of Defense," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521447287, October.
    29. Brennan, Geoffrey & Pincus, Jonathan J, 1983. "Government Expenditure Growth and Resource Allocation: The Nebulous Connection," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 351-365, November.
    30. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    31. Lindert, Peter H., 1996. "What Limits Social Spending?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-34, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Castles, Francis G., 2006. "The growth of the post-war public expenditure state: long-term trajectories and recent trends," TranState Working Papers 35, University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State.
    2. Konstantin Yanovskiy & Sergey Zhavoronkov & Dmitry Shestakov, 2013. "Democracy of "Taxation-Redistribution" and Peacetime Budget Deficit," Working Papers 0078, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2013.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Eloranta, Jari, 2004. "WARFARE AND WELFARE? Understanding 19th and 20th Century Central Government Spending," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 699, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    2. Mulligan Casey B & Gil Ricard & Sala-i-Martin Xavier X, 2010. "Social Security and Democracy," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-46, March.
    3. Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter.
    4. Kammas, Pantelis & Sarantides, Vassilis, 2019. "Do dictatorships redistribute more?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 176-195.
    5. Pistoresi, Barbara & Rinaldi, Alberto & Salsano, Francesco, 2017. "Government spending and its components in Italy, 1862–2009: Drivers and policy implications," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 1117-1140.
    6. Barbara Pistoresi & Alberto Rinaldi & Francesco Salsano, 2015. "Government expenditure and economic development: evidence from Italy 1862-2009," Department of Economics 0065, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    7. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    8. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
    9. Dietrich Fischer & Jurgen Brauer, 2003. "Twenty questions for peace economics: A research agenda," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 223-236.
    10. Cavicchioli, Maddalena & Pistoresi, Barbara, 2016. "Testing threshold cointegration in Wagner's Law: The role of military spending," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 23-31.
    11. Brückner, Markus & Chong, Alberto & Gradstein, Mark, 2012. "Estimating the permanent income elasticity of government expenditures: Evidence on Wagner's law based on oil price shocks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 1025-1035.
    12. Sergio Espuelas, 2015. "The inequality trap. A comparative analysis of social spending between 1880 and 1930," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 68(2), pages 683-706, May.
    13. Sandrine Michel, 2018. "Social spending as a driver of economic growth: has the theoretical consensus of the 1980s led to successful economic policies?," Post-Print hal-01944296, HAL.
    14. Josten, Stefan Dietrich & Truger, Achim, 2003. "The political economy of growth and distribution: A theoretical critique," WSI Working Papers 111, The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans Böckler Foundation.
    15. Durevall, Dick & Henrekson, Magnus, 2011. "The futile quest for a grand explanation of long-run government expenditure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 708-722, August.
    16. Aidt, T. & Jensen, P.S., 2007. "The Taxman Tools Up: An Event History Study of the Introduction of the Personal Income Tax in Western Europe, 1815-1941," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0766, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    17. Jørgen Andersen, 2012. "Costs of taxation and the size of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 83-115, October.
    18. Lindert, Peter H., 2003. "Voice and Growth: Was Churchill Right?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 315-350, June.
    19. Olper, Alessandro & Falkowski, Jan & Swinnen, Johan F.M., 2009. "Democracy and Agricultural Protection: Parametric and Semi-parametric Matching Estimates," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49313, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    20. Casey B.Mulligan & Ricard Gil, 2002. "Social spending and democracy: some evidence from South America," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 29(1 Year 20), pages 5-33, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269593. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.