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Learning Rational Expectations In A Policy Game

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  • Cripps, M. W.

Abstract

Rational expectations is a maintained assumption in the analysis of economic policy. Here we examine how two types of learning rational expectations (rational and econometric) affect the time profile of optimal policy. In both cases the government adopts policies which delay convergence to rational expectations. There is also a. reduction in the inflationary bias, in one case permanently in the other temporarily.

Suggested Citation

  • Cripps, M. W., 1988. "Learning Rational Expectations In A Policy Game," Economic Research Papers 268333, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:268333
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.268333
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    2. Basar, Tamer & Salmon, Mark, 1990. "Credibility and the value of information transmission in a model of monetary policy and inflation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 97-116, February.
    3. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    4. David Backus & John Driffill, 1985. "Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(2), pages 211-221.
    5. Bray, Margaret M & Savin, Nathan E, 1986. "Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1129-1160, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Caleiro, António, 2008. "How Can Voters Classify an Incumbent under Output Persistence," Economics Discussion Papers 2008-16, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Huh, Chan G. & Lansing, Kevin J., 2000. "Expectations, credibility, and disinflation in a small macroeconomic model," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(1-2), pages 51-86.
    3. Pyatt, Graham, 1987. "The Sam Approach in Retrospect and Prospect," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 290, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Ellison, Martin, 2006. "The learning cost of interest rate reversals," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 1895-1907, November.
    5. Basar, Tamer & Salmon, Mark, 1990. "Credibility and the value of information transmission in a model of monetary policy and inflation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 97-116, February.
    6. Cone, Thomas E., 2005. "Learnability and transparency with time inconsistent monetary policy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 187-191, May.
    7. Cripps, Martin, 1989. "Reputation Effects in Dynamic Games," Economic Research Papers 268363, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    8. Tetlow, Robert J. & von zur Muehlen, Peter, 2001. "Simplicity versus optimality: The choice of monetary policy rules when agents must learn," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 245-279, January.

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