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Transfers To Agriculture: Links To Lobbying

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  • Ndayisenga, Fidele
  • Kinsey, Jean D.

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to systematically incorporate lobbying in a microeconomic model of the profit maximizing farmer, derive testable implications of the model and apply it to establish the link, or lack thereof, between policy benefits transferred to farmers and their lobbying expenditures. Policy transfers will be measured by the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), a comprehensive annual dollar measure of transfers to producers that results from government intervention in agriculture (Josling and Tangerman, 1988).

Suggested Citation

  • Ndayisenga, Fidele & Kinsey, Jean D., 1995. "Transfers To Agriculture: Links To Lobbying," Working Papers 14435, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:umciwp:14435
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.14435
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/14435/files/wp95-01.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Uri Ben-Zion & Zeev Eytan, 1974. "On money, votes, and policy in a democratic society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 1-10, March.
    2. David S. Bullock, 1992. "Objectives and Constraints of Government Policy: The Countercyclicity of Transfers to Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 74(3), pages 617-629.
    3. Coggins, Jay S & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore & Roe, Terry L, 1991. "Existence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 533-550, August.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cemal Atici, 2005. "Weight Perception and Efficiency Loss in Bilateral Trading: The Case of US and EU Agricultural Policies," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 283-292, November.
    2. Cemal Atici, 2008. "Political Economy of Agricultural Policies and Environmental Weights," ICER Working Papers 25-2008, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.

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