IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ier/iecrev/v32y1991i3p533-50.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Existence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Coggins, Jay S
  • Graham-Tomasi, Theodore
  • Roe, Terry L

Abstract

This paper establishes the existence of equilibrium in a model with a central authority that sets relative prices in response to agents' political activity. To a small open economy the authors graft a government price-setting program that responds to the lobbying pressure of opposing interests. The proof involves reformulating the lobbying economy as a noncooperative generalized game, establishing the existence of an equilibrium in the economy. Agents' choice sets are found to be nonconvex, a difficulty that the authors resolve by an appropriate restriction on preferences. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Coggins, Jay S & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore & Roe, Terry L, 1991. "Existence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 533-550, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:32:y:1991:i:3:p:533-50
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-6598%28199108%2932%3A3%3C533%3AEOEIAL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hom M Pant, 1996. "Endogenous Behaviour of the Tariff Rate in a Political Economy," International Trade 9609001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Oct 1996.
    2. Ho, Shirley J., 2007. "Impacts of interest groups: Endogenous interaction and lobbying limits," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 506-522, May.
    3. Roe, Terry L., 1992. "Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: A General Equilibirum- Interest Group Perspective," Bulletins 7467, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
    4. Jay S. Coggins, 1995. "Rent Dissipation And The Social Cost Of Price Policy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 147-166, July.
    5. Roe, T.R., 1992. "Structural Adjustment within Developing Countries," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 28.
    6. Chen, Kai-Lih & Graham-Tomasi, Ted & Roe, Terry, 1993. "Political Economy and Pollution Regulation: Instrument Choice in a Lobbying Economy," Staff Paper Series 201174, Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics.
    7. Coggins, Jay S., 1994. "Implementing Agricultural Policy Virtually: The Case of Set-Aside," Staff Papers 200579, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    8. Coggins, Jay S., 1994. "Trade and the Food Industries: Public and Social Choice," Staff Papers 200577, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    9. Ndayisenga, Fidele & Kinsey, Jean D., 1995. "Transfers To Agriculture: Links To Lobbying," Working Papers 14435, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy.
    10. Kinsey, Jean D. & Ndayisenga, Fidele, 1999. "The Impact Of Political Contributions By Food Manufacturing Firms On U.S. Farm Policy," Journal of Agribusiness, Agricultural Economics Association of Georgia, vol. 17(1), pages 1-15.
    11. Ndayisenga, Fidele & Kinsey, Jean D., 1994. "Food Processors' Lobbying Activity And Farm Policy," Staff Papers 13581, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    12. Coggins, Jay S., 1992. "Rent Dissipation and the Social Cost of Price Policy," Staff Papers 200551, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    13. Coggins, Jay S., 1992. "Rent Dissipation And The Social Cost Of Price Policy," 1992 Annual Meeting, August 9-12, Baltimore, Maryland 271378, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:32:y:1991:i:3:p:533-50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deupaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.