IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/ubzefd/62160.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem

Author

Listed:
  • Stark, Oded

Abstract

The naturalization of asylum seekers is modeled as an economic problem. In choosing their level of investment in host-country-specific human capital, asylum seekers take into consideration the probability of their being naturalized. The government of the host country chooses the probability of naturalization that most encourages the acquisition of such human capital. That human capital, in turn, increases the asylum seekers’ productivity and earnings and, consequently, maximizes the government’s tax receipts if the asylum seekers are allowed to stay permanently. Conditions are presented under which the optimal level of investment in the host-country-specific human capital is positive, and rises in the probability of naturalization. The asylum seeker’s rational response to the probability of (legal) long-term residency is incorporated in the government’s optimization process. Thus, both the asylum seekers and the government of their host country are modeled as optimizing economic agents in a setting not of their own choosing.

Suggested Citation

  • Stark, Oded, 2010. "Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem," Discussion Papers 62160, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ubzefd:62160
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.62160
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/62160/files/ZEFDP137.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.62160?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ortega, Francesc, 2005. "Immigration quotas and skill upgrading," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1841-1863, September.
    2. Giovanni Facchini & Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2006. "Asylum seekers in Europe: the warm glow of a hot potato," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 411-430, June.
    3. Fabio, MARIANI, 2004. "The Political Economy of Immigrants Naturalization," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2004022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    4. Timothy J. Hatton, 2004. "Seeking asylum in Europe [‘Violence against citizens in civil wars: looting or terror?’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 19(38), pages 6-62.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Stark, Oded & Bielawski, Jakub & Jakubek, Marcin, 2015. "The impact of the assimilation of migrants on the well-being of native inhabitants: A theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 71-78.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Giordani, Paolo E. & Ruta, Michele, 2013. "Coordination failures in immigration policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 55-67.
    2. Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús & Rapoport, Hillel, 2014. "Tradable immigration quotas," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 94-108.
    3. Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa, 2009. "Who Is Against a Common Market?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(5), pages 1068-1100, September.
    4. Timothy J. Hatton, 2015. "Asylum Policy in the EU: the Case for Deeper Integration," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 61(3-4), pages 605-637.
    5. Giuseppe Russo & Luigi Senatore, 2013. "Who contributes? A strategic approach to a European immigration policy," IZA Journal of Migration and Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 2(1), pages 1-16, December.
    6. Djajić, Slobodan, 2014. "Asylum seeking and irregular migration," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 83-95.
    7. Slobodan Djajić & Michael S. Michael, 2014. "Controlling Illegal Immigration: On the Scope for Cooperation with a Transit Country," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 808-824, September.
    8. Christian Dustmann & Francesco Fasani & Tommaso Frattini & Luigi Minale & Uta Schönberg, 2017. "On the economics and politics of refugee migration," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 32(91), pages 497-550.
    9. Ohta, Katsunori & Tamura, Yuji, 2023. "Refugee Resettlement," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1237, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    10. Rayp, Glenn & Ruyssen, Ilse & Standaert, Samuel, 2017. "Measuring and Explaining Cross-Country Immigration Policies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 141-163.
    11. Michele Cantarella, 2019. "#Portichiusi: the human costs of migrant deterrence in the Mediterranean," HiCN Working Papers 317, Households in Conflict Network.
    12. Fabio Mariani, 2013. "The political economy of naturalization," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 46(2), pages 656-688, May.
    13. Yuji Tamura, 2017. "Asylum providers: Hawks or Doves?," CEPR Discussion Papers 699, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    14. Tim Krieger & Steffen Minter, 2007. "Immigration amnesties in the southern EU member states - a challenge for the entire EU?," Working Papers CIE 6, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    15. Michele Cantarella, 2019. "#Portichiusi: the human costs of migrant deterrence in the Mediterranean," Department of Economics 0154, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    16. Mathias Czaika, 2009. "Asylum Cooperation among Asymmetric Countries," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 89-113, March.
    17. Assaf Razin, 2013. "MIGRATION into the WELFARE STATE: tax and migration competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(4), pages 548-563, August.
    18. Drometer, Marcus & Méango, Romuald, 2015. "Electoral cycles, partisan effects and U.S. immigration policies," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113052, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Jenny Monheim, "undated". "Human Trafficking and the Effectiveness of Asylum Policies," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2008-1-1221, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    20. Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga & Hillel Rapoport, 2015. "Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 61(3-4), pages 638-672.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Economics; Labor and Human Capital; Political Economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:ubzefd:62160. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/zefbnde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.