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Agricultural Production Restrictions and Market Power: An Antitrust Analysis

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  • Bolotova, Yuliya

Abstract

During the recent decade the organizations of agricultural producers in the national dairy, potato, egg and mushroom industries implemented various pre-production and production restriction practices with the primary objective of agricultural output price stabilization. The buyers of the affected agricultural commodities have challenged the legal status of production restrictions in a number of recent and current antitrust lawsuits, arguing that the Capper-Volstead Act, a limited antitrust exemption, does not protect production restrictions. Using the theory of oligopoly, this research evaluates potential market effects of agricultural production restrictions by comparing the organizations of agricultural producers with classic illegal cartels, which harmful effects antitrust law aims to prevent. The available empirical evidence on the market and price effects of agricultural output control practices is discussed in light of the theoretical analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Bolotova, Yuliya, 2015. "Agricultural Production Restrictions and Market Power: An Antitrust Analysis," 2015 Annual Meeting, January 31-February 3, 2015, Atlanta, Georgia 196848, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:saea15:196848
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.196848
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yuliya Bolotova & John M. Connor & Douglas J. Miller, 2007. "Factors influencing the magnitude of cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis of food-industry cartels," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(1), pages 17-33.
    2. Bolotova, Yuliya V., 2009. "Cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 321-341, May.
    3. Bolotova, Yuliya & McIntosh, Christopher S. & Muthusamy, Kalamani & Patterson, Paul E., 2008. "The Impact of Coordination of Production and Marketing Strategies on Price Behavior: Evidence from the Idaho Potato Industry," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 11(3), pages 1-30, September.
    4. Bolotova, Yuliya, 2014. "Agricultural Supply Management and Antitrust in the United States System of Agribusiness," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 17(3), pages 1-24, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Marketing;
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