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Multi-market Collusion with Territorial Allocation

Author

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  • ADITYA BHATTACHARJEA

    (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India)

  • UDAY BHANU SINHA

    (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India)

Abstract

This paper develops a supergame model of collusion between price-setting oligopolists located in different markets separated by trade costs. The firms produce a homogenous good and sustain collusion based on territorial allocation of markets. We first show, in a more general framework than some earlier literature, that a reduction in trade costs can paradoxically increase the sustainability of collusion. Then we prove a new paradox where the scope for collusion may be enhanced by an increase in the number of firms. We discuss several implications for trade and antitrust policy in this context.

Suggested Citation

  • Aditya Bhattacharjea & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2012. "Multi-market Collusion with Territorial Allocation," Working papers 217, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:217
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bhattacharjea, Aditya & Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2015. "Multi-market collusion with territorial allocation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 42-50.
    2. Avdasheva, S., 2017. "Theory of Competition for Economic Policy," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 170-176.
    3. Isogai, Shigeki & Shen, Chaohai, 2023. "Multiproduct firm’s reputation and leniency program in multimarket collusion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    4. Xiaowei Wang & Wuyan Long & Meiyue Sang & Yang Yang, 2022. "Towards Sustainable Urbanization: Exploring the Influence Paths of the Urban Environment on Bidders’ Collusive Willingness," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-14, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multimarket contact; collusion; trade costs; territorial allocation; cartels;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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