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Straight Versus Gradual Opening of Developed and Developing Economies

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  • Park, Jang Woo

Abstract

Rather than straight opening, a country or financial market should use gradual opening to minimize the costs of such a process. This paper provides a model of three players - one more developed than the other - that allocates their costs of opening to the others. All markets trade many goods such as financial products, and a cooperative game approach is used. The main game theoretic instrument is the Shapley value.

Suggested Citation

  • Park, Jang Woo, 2013. "Straight Versus Gradual Opening of Developed and Developing Economies," Conference papers 332320, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:pugtwp:332320
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    3. S.C. Littlechild & G.F. Thompson, 1977. "Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 186-204, Spring.
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