IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/annopr/v226y2015i1p51-6810.1007-s10479-014-1698-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fair ticket pricing in public transport as a constrained cost allocation game

Author

Listed:
  • Ralf Borndörfer
  • Nam-Dũng Hoang

Abstract

Ticket pricing in public transport usually takes a welfare maximization point of view. Such an approach, however, does not consider fairness in the sense that users of a shared infrastructure should pay for the costs that they generate. We propose an ansatz to determine fair ticket prices that combines concepts from cooperative game theory and linear and integer programming. The ticket pricing problem is considered to be a constrained cost allocation game, which is a generalization of cost allocation games that allows to deal with constraints on output prices and on the formation of coalitions. An application to pricing railway tickets for the intercity network of the Netherlands is presented. The results demonstrate that the fairness of prices can be improved substantially in this way. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Ralf Borndörfer & Nam-Dũng Hoang, 2015. "Fair ticket pricing in public transport as a constrained cost allocation game," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 226(1), pages 51-68, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:226:y:2015:i:1:p:51-68:10.1007/s10479-014-1698-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-014-1698-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10479-014-1698-z
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10479-014-1698-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maschler, M. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "The general nucleolus and the reduced game property," Other publications TiSEM ab187dab-1b5b-40c3-a673-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. S.C. Littlechild & G.F. Thompson, 1977. "Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 186-204, Spring.
    3. Ralf Borndörfer & Marika Neumann & Marc E. Pfetsch, 2006. "Optimal Fares for Public Transport," Operations Research Proceedings, in: Hans-Dietrich Haasis & Herbert Kopfer & Jörn Schönberger (ed.), Operations Research Proceedings 2005, pages 591-596, Springer.
    4. Stefan Engevall & Maud Göthe-Lundgren & Peter Värbrand, 1998. "The traveling salesman game: An application ofcost allocation in a gas and oil company," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 82(0), pages 203-218, August.
    5. Maschler, M & Potters, J A M & Tijs, S H, 1992. "The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(1), pages 85-106.
    6. Gately, Dermot, 1974. "Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(1), pages 195-208, February.
    7. Hallefjord, Asa & Helming, Reidun & Jornsten, Kurt, 1995. "Computing the Nucleolus When the Characteristic Function Is Given Implicitly: A Constraint Generation Approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(4), pages 357-372.
    8. Ulrich Faigle & Walter Kern & Daniël Paulusma, 2000. "Note on the computational complexity of least core concepts for min-cost spanning tree games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 52(1), pages 23-38, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jessica Rodríguez‐Pereira & Burcu Balcik & Marie‐Ève Rancourt & Gilbert Laporte, 2021. "A Cost‐Sharing Mechanism for Multi‐Country Partnerships in Disaster Preparedness," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(12), pages 4541-4565, December.
    2. Antonín Pavlíček & František Sudzina, 2020. "Intergroup Comparison of Personalities in the Preferred Pricing of Public Transport in Rush Hours: Data Revisited," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(12), pages 1-9, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stefan Engevall & Maud Göthe-Lundgren & Peter Värbrand, 2004. "The Heterogeneous Vehicle-Routing Game," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(1), pages 71-85, February.
    2. Potters, Jos & Sudholter, Peter, 1999. "Airport problems and consistent allocation rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 83-102, July.
    3. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Gruijters, A.P.D., 1989. "On the effectiveness of daily interventions by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the federal reserve system in the U.S. Dollar-Deutsche Mark exchange market," Other publications TiSEM cd65eff1-5f9e-4262-8f38-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Nishizaki, Ichiro & Sakawa, Masatoshi, 2001. "On computational methods for solutions of multiobjective linear production programming games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 129(2), pages 386-413, March.
    5. Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef, 1996. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(1), pages 13-34.
    6. Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena & Peter Sudhölter, 2020. "Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(3), pages 1056-1068, August.
    7. Theodore E. Nijman & Roel Beetsma, 1991. "Empirical Tests of a Simple Pricing Model for Sugar Futures," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 24, pages 121-131.
    8. Arce M., Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2003. "Health-promoting alliances," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 355-375, June.
    9. David K. Hildebrand & James D. Laing & Howard Rosenthal, 1980. "Prediction Analysis of Economic Models," NBER Chapters, in: Evaluation of Econometric Models, pages 91-122, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Sexton, Richard J., 1991. "Game Theory: A Review With Applications To Vertical Control In Agricultural Markets," Working Papers 225865, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    11. Tamás Solymosi, 2019. "Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions (extended version)," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1914, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    12. Quant, Marieke & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud & Zwikker, Peter, 2006. "Compromise solutions based on bankruptcy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 247-256, May.
    13. Tamás Solymosi, 2019. "Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1087-1109, December.
    14. Rodica Brânzei & Tamás Solymosi & Stef Tijs, 2005. "Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 447-460, September.
    15. Eijffinger, Sylvester & van Rixtel, Adrian, 1992. "The Japanese financial system and monetary policy: a descriptive review," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 291-309, December.
    16. Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1993. "Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries," Other publications TiSEM 0401b17a-e2c7-4179-ace9-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    17. Zou, L., 1993. "Ownership structure and efficiency : An incentive mechanism approach," Other publications TiSEM a72a05c2-b3f2-47c7-a003-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    18. D. Granot & H. Hamers & J. Kuipers & M. Maschler, 2004. "Chinese Postman Games on a Class of Eulerian Graphs," Discussion Paper Series dp366, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    19. Park, Jang Woo, 2013. "Straight Versus Gradual Opening of Developed and Developing Economies," Conference papers 332320, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    20. Reiner Wolff & Yavuz Karagök, 2012. "Consistent allocation of cabinet seats: the Swiss Magic Formula," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 547-559, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:226:y:2015:i:1:p:51-68:10.1007/s10479-014-1698-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.