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Rent Seeking for Export Licenses: Application to the Vietnam Rice Market

Author

Listed:
  • Vu, T.N.
  • Vo, D.H.
  • McAleer, M.J.

Abstract

The paper develops a model to examine rent seeking in innovation and export licenses, with an application to Vietnam rice exports. Firms can lobby for export restrictions or for free trade. Innovation is introduced as a cost-reducing technology. The analysis focuses on the innovation incentives of the firm lobbying for export restrictions, and the determinants of lobbying incentives. The analysis shows that firms lobbying for export restrictions may have lower incentives to adopt technological innovations under export restrictions than under free trade. The findings can help to identify economic inefficiency when the political elites use export restrictions to seek rents.

Suggested Citation

  • Vu, T.N. & Vo, D.H. & McAleer, M.J., 2019. "Rent Seeking for Export Licenses: Application to the Vietnam Rice Market," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI2019-09, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:ems:eureir:115607
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trade restrictions; export licenses; innovation; monopoly; rent seeking; free trade; economic development;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F63 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization - - - Economic Development
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation

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