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Towards a Theoretical Framework for Policy Behavioral Equations

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  • Beghin, John C.

Abstract

A game-theoretic framework unifies the revealed preference approach to government objectives· and the policy behavioral equation methodology. Public policies are the equilibrium outcome of a cooperative game among interest groups and the policy maker. This study stresses the interdependencebetween policies and players' bargaining strength, and derives their comparative statics with respect to a changing economic environment. ·rt provides a specification of behavioral equations consistent with the underlying bargaining process. An analysis of the political economy of food and agricultural price policies in Senegal illustrates the proposed framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Beghin, John C., 1988. "Towards a Theoretical Framework for Policy Behavioral Equations," Department of Economics and Business - Archive 259443, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ncbuar:259443
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.259443
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Pinhas Zusman & Amotz Amiad, 1977. "A Quantitative Investigation of a Political Economy—The Israeli Dairy Program," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 59(1), pages 88-98.
    3. Gordon C. Rausser & D. Peter Stonehouse, 1978. "Public Intervention and Producer Supply Response," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 60(5), pages 885-890.
    4. Philip C. Abbott, 1979. "Modeling International Grain Trade with Government Controlled Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 61(1), pages 22-31.
    5. Philip L. Paarlberg & Philip C. Abbott, 1986. "Oligopolistic Behavior by Public Agencies in International Trade: The World Wheat Market," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 68(3), pages 528-542.
    6. Alexander H. Sarris & John Freebairn, 1983. "Endogenous Price Policies and International Wheat Prices," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 65(2), pages 214-224.
    7. Zusman, Pinhas, 1976. "The Incorporation and Measurement of Social Power in Economic Models," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 17(2), pages 447-462, June.
    8. Beghin, John C. & Karp, Larry S., 1988. "A Game Theoretic Model Of Agricultural And Food Price Policies In Senegal," 1988 Annual Meeting, August 1-3, Knoxville, Tennessee 270316, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    9. Thomson, William, 1987. "Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 50-58, June.
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