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Imperfectly Informative Equilibria for Signalling Games

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  • Fishman, Arthur

Abstract

I analyze the equilibria of signalling games in which initially uninformed players may choose to become informed from an external source at a cost. It is shown that the lower this cost, the greater the extent to which the informed player's actions reveal its private information and the more the outcome resembles the symmetric information equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Fishman, Arthur, 1995. "Imperfectly Informative Equilibria for Signalling Games," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275603, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275603
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275603
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
    2. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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