A little skin in the microfinance game: reducing moral hazard in joint liability group lending through a mandatory collateral requirement
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.236157
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- Sui, Xin & Li, Liang, 2018. "Guarantee network model and risk contagion," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 323-329.
- Sui, Xin & Li, Liang & Chen, Xiaohui, 2020. "Risk contagion caused by interactions between credit and guarantee networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 539(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Agricultural Finance; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Risk and Uncertainty;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2016-06-09 (Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2016-06-09 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2016-06-09 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MFD-2016-06-09 (Microfinance)
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