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Artificial Agents as an Application to Policy Design: The Market Entry Game

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  • Bejarano, Hernan D.
  • Latek, Maciej M.

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  • Bejarano, Hernan D. & Latek, Maciej M., 2011. "Artificial Agents as an Application to Policy Design: The Market Entry Game," 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 103900, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea11:103900
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.103900
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
    2. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1193-1235, September.
    3. Amnon Rapoport & Darryl A. Seale & Ido Erev & James A. Sundali, 1998. "Equilibrium Play in Large Group Market Entry Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(1), pages 119-141, January.
    4. Amnon Rapoport & Tamar Kugler & Subhasish Dugar & Eyran J. Gisches, 2008. "Braess Paradox in the Laboratory: Experimental Study of Route Choice in Traffic Networks with Asymmetric Costs," Springer Optimization and Its Applications, in: Tamar Kugler & J. Cole Smith & Terry Connolly & Young-Jun Son (ed.), Decision Modeling and Behavior in Complex and Uncertain Environments, pages 309-337, Springer.
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